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The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether government policy to
reallocate subsidy funds into infrastructure projects is favorable for the
Indonesian economy in terms of GDP and income distribution. A financial
CGE model is employed to simulate the impact of fiscal policy regarding fuel
subsidy funds and road investment, calibrating the Indonesian Financial SAM
of 2008. Other policy options have also been simulated to identify a better
policy for economic growth and income inequality. This research is the first
Financial CGE model of Indonesia to use Financial SAM 2008 as its database.
The model in this research is a dynamic Financial CGE model with attributes
of ten sectors, four households and seven economic actors, twelve labor
groups and three type of assets. It is found that the policy of using additional
tax to build road infrastructure generates the highest GDP increase. The
policy to reduce fuel subsidies is the best policy measure regarding the
distribution of income. Furthermore, if the government also has the concern
to release fiscal pressure, then the shifting of fuel subsidy to infrastructure
provision is applicable.
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After the 1998 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's economic
growth on average was slower than during the pre-crisis period. In
the period from 1980 to shortly before the crisis of 1997, the
average growth of the Indonesian economy reached 6.9% per year.
While in the post-crisis period of 1999-2015 the growth was
decelerated to 5.3% per year. In more detail, it was the share of
agriculture sector and oil and gas sector which was shrinking during
the 2000s. The Agricultural sector shrank from 15.6% in 2000 to
12.1% in 2014, while the oil and gas sector share dropped
precipitously from 12.3% in 2000 to 4.5% in 2014.
In contrast, the sector that has strengthened its role in GDP is
the transport and communications sector, which has growth on
average reaching 12.1% per year during 2000-2014. This share of
GDP increased from 4.7% in 2000 to 11.0% in 2014. The growth of
this sector is mainly due to the fast growth in modern
communications technology. Meanwhile, regarding income
distribution, the Gini coefficient ratio continues to increase since the
２
Asian financial crisis. In 1997, when one-fourth of Indonesian
household became poor, the Gini index was at its lowest point of
0.29. Afterward, the inequality index has been edging up as the
Indonesian economy is recovering until it reached its highest point
of 0.41 in 2011 and lasted until 2014. Then in 2015, the inequality
index fell slightly to 0.40. It is uncertain as to why inequality
increased during the period from 1997-2014. Some of the probable
causes included a commodity boom, rigidity in the formal labor
market, rice prices and cash transfer (Yusuf et al.: 2014).
The domination of oil and gas products in Indonesia’s export
ended in 1987, replaced by manufactured goods such as plywood,
textiles, garments, footwear, electrical appliances, and palm oil. The
role of oil and gas revenue in the state budget continues to
experience a declining trend. In 2000, the proportion of oil and gas
in total government revenues was 41.6%, however, in 2013 this
was only 15.6%. The rest of central government revenue is derived
from taxes, dominantly income tax and value added tax.
One of the problems that the government of Indonesia faced in
2000's era is the amount of energy subsidies. Each fiscal year the
government has to allocate fuel subsidy expenditure which can take
up a significant portion of the Indonesian state budget and at the
３
same time causes the government to suffer fiscal pressures due to
a decrease in oil revenues in the form tax and non-tax revenues.
Energy subsidies in the form of cheap fuel and electricity prices
in Indonesia began in the oil boom of the 1970s. The government
had provided subsidies as an economic stimulus, which was not
well-managed and in turn caused a moral hazard in the form of
wasted fuel and smuggling. Due to high economic growth and rapid
growth of the middle classes, Indonesia gradually faced higher fuel
demand. Therefore the amount of fuel subsidy continued to increase.
Alternatively, it became an oil-importing country in 2003.
Since the Asian crisis, the government allocated more funds to
fuel subsidy than to capital expenditure. Economic agents have long
enjoyed subsidies, cheap energy is taken for granted, and there is
no intention to save energy. An increasing amount of the energy
subsidies were not only the government's financial burden but also
had adverse environmental impacts in the form of air pollution and
CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. Luthfi and Kaneko (2016)
suggested that if the fuel subsidy in Indonesia were abolished, then
the CO2 would reduce by 70 million tons.
The existence and magnitude of fuel subsidies have always
been a public debate, especially when the prices of international oil
４
fluctuate sharply. In 2004-2014, the average portion of fuel
subsidy reached 16.6 percent of central government expenditure,
with the highest point reaching 26.5 percent, in 2005 when the
world crude oil price was US$51.8 per barrel. A high percentage of
energy subsidies to government budget suppresses fiscal space; it
means that there are limited resources available for the
governments to promote economic growth through investment in
infrastructure and human capital; and also to provide social
protection for low-income groups through better-targeted
subsidies and other social expenditures.
Removing fuel subsidy is problematic as fuel prices are
embedded in households and firms’ optimization problems,
imposing negative impacts, particularly to the poor and medium
income households (Widodo et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the new
administration under President Joko Widodo took on a different
policy compared to his predecessors to massively cut the fuel
subsidy starting in 2015. This policy was a part of a structural
reform and was intended to be beneficial for the improvement of
economic conditions in the long term. It was designed to develop
structural changes in the economy, both for the government and
households. In 2015, the government no longer provided subsidies
５
on regular gasoline, while diesel oil received a fixed subsidy for
Rp1000/liter (US$0.07). The proportion of fuel subsidy dropped to
5.1% of central government spending in 2015, which created a
fiscal space for the government to run other policies such as the
provision of infrastructure.
The partial reallocation of the fuel subsidy to infrastructure
provision was shown by the increase of infrastructure funds, from
12.9% of the central government budget (average 2008-2014) to
16.0% in 2015. Nevertheless, the global economic slowdown and
other factors have caused Indonesian economic growth to
decelerate from 5.02% in 2014 to 4.74% in 2015. The outputs of
the petroleum and chemical sectors, where the fuel subsidy was
disbursed to the SOE Pertamina have been decreased by 1.76%. On
the contrary, the construction sector, where government
infrastructure investment is allocated, has increased in productivity
by 6.6% in 2015. Other aspects show that income distribution was
improved, indicated by the slight decrease of the Gini ratio. It
would be of interest to identify; what is the impact of shifting the
fuel subsidy to the development of infrastructure on Indonesian
economy? Is there any improvement in income distribution?
６
The main objective of this research is to analyze the impact of
fiscal policy in reallocating fuel subsidy into infrastructure
development, whether the policy is favorable to the Indonesian
economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its effects
on income distribution. The paper intends to explore these issues, a
financial computable general equilibrium (FCGE) is used in this
research.
1.2. Purpose of Research
In this research, the financial social accounting matrix (FSAM)
2005 is updated to FSAM 2008 as the database of the Indonesian
economy. Based on the FSAM 2008, a financial CGE model is
developed prior to conducting simulations of shifting the fuel
subsidy to road infrastructure development on the distributional
spectrum of macroeconomic and microeconomic variables, such as
GDP and household income distribution. The FCGE model in this
research is built upon two major background studies. These are, the
financing model of Kim (1998) and the transportation network
model of Kim et al. (2004). The parameters in the equation of the
real and financial sector were estimated using actual Indonesian
data, in most cases a time series data from various sources. Some
７
parameters that are already available from previous studies are
adopted for the model. After completion of the model calibration and
estimation, various fiscal policies concerning fuel subsidy and
sources of fund of infrastructure development are simulated to
identify the differences between its impact on GDP and income
distribution.
1.3. Content of Dissertation
The paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter, the
Indonesian economic policy relating to economic growth and income
distribution is reviewed in the first part, along with economic
performance following the Asian financial crisis, until its recent
development. The second part describes the oil and petroleum
industry in relation to the subsidies policy and government budget.
The last part discusses infrastructure policy, specifically relating to
road development.
Chapter 3 is intended to provide an extensive literature review
of CGE modeling. It starts with fiscal policy literature, concerning
fuel subsidy and infrastructure provision. Then, discussion on the
structure of CGE modeling consisting of definition and type of CGE
model. Subchapter 3.2 is dedicated to the previous work which uses
８
the financial CGE model, and then covers the development of CGE
modeling in Indonesia.
Chapter 4 presents the Indonesian Financial CGE model used in
this paper. Most of the relevant equations in the model are
explained, then followed by descriptions of the parameters and
coefficients appearing in the behavioral and technical equation of
the model. The last section of this chapter describes the updating
process of FSAM 2008 from FSAM 2005.
Chapter 5 describes the policy options and policy simulation
used in this research. The results of various counterfactual policy
simulation are reported. Given these results, the impact of various
fiscal policies and its funding options are analyzed. Finally, Chapter
6 is devoted to conclusions, consisting of a summary of current
research and a further research agenda.
９
Chapter 2. Indonesian Economic Policy
2.1. Economic Development Policies of Indonesia
At the beginning of Soeharto’s era in 1967, the government’s
economic policies focused on how to rescue the national economy;
especially to control 650% hyper-inflation, to rescue government
financial reserve and safeguard people's basic needs. The policy to
restore the economic structure and development is as follows.
Firstly, economic stabilization to control the inflation. Secondly,
economic rehabilitation by improving physical facilities and
economic infrastructure. The implementation of this national
development in Soeharto’s era was based on the development
trilogy that is; an equitable distribution of development and its
results towards the creation of social justice for all the people, high
economic growth, and national stability.
The development plan is divided into five yearly priority
programs. Pelita I (five-year development) during the period
1969-1974, which focused on the agricultural and industrial
sectors that support agriculture. The aim was to improve the lives
of the people and at the same time lay the groundwork for
development to the next stage with a goal of food, clothing,
１０
improvement of infrastructure, housing, employment expansion, and
spiritual well-being.
Pelita II (1974-1979) focusing on the agricultural sector by
increasing the raw materials industry processing into intermediate
goods. The main target was the availability of food, clothing,
housing, infrastructure, the welfare of the people and expanding
employment opportunities. Economic growth reached 7%, on
average. At the beginning of the Soeharto’s era inflation reached
60%, and by the end of Pelita I the inflation rate dropped to 47%. In
the fourth year of Pelita II, inflation fell to 9.5%. Pelita III (1979-
1984) focused on the agricultural sector regarding food self-
sufficiency and improvements to industrial processing of
intermediate goods into finished goods.
The agriculture sector that supports the realization of food
self-sufficiency was still continued in the Pelita IV (1984-1989),
plus an increase in the manufacture and machinery industry. In the
early 1980s, economic recession affected the economy of Indonesia.
The government introduced significant monetary and fiscal policies
such as budget retrenchment, tax reform, rupiah devaluation and
financial liberalization (Kim, 1990) to sustain economic
development. Pelita V (1989-1994) was still reliant on agriculture
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and industry but was able to create favorable economic conditions
indicated by an average economic growth of 6.8% per year. Pelita
VI (1994- 1999) focused on the development of the economic
sectors related to industry and agriculture, and the development and
improvement of the quality of human resources. In this period, the
Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia, which led to the political turmoil
and the fall of the Soeharto regime.
In the 1980s until shortly before the Asian financial crisis of
1997, the Indonesian economy growth averaged 6.9% per year.
Following the crisis, Indonesia's economic growth was slower than
that of the pre-crisis period. In the post-crisis period of 1999-
2015, the economic growth was decelerated to 5.3% per year, on
average. The Indonesian economy is among the most resilient
economies in the world. When the global financial crisis occurred in
2009, Indonesia still grew by 4.6% while almost all other countries
in the world experienced negative growth. The strength of
Indonesia's economy is mainly supported by strong private
consumption, which is 56.5% (average 2010-2015) of the total
GDP. Besides private consumption, investment is the second-
largest share of GDP, amounting to 33.7%, followed by government
consumption of 9.3% and the remainder is from net exports. The
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resilience of the Indonesian economy is inseparable from the role of
government economic policies. For instance, in 2009 during a global
economic slowdown, the government launched a counter-cyclical
policy that contained programs to maintain the level of consumption,
investment, and exports. The policy to reduce tax rates and
increase non-taxable income are issued to maintain consumption
levels. The government also provided tax-free incentives to
attract investors in strategic industry sectors such as geothermal
and biofuels. Furthermore, to support export volume, the
government launched the export credit program, which meant that
exporters had their working capital immediately ready before
receiving the payment results from abroad.
The Government committed to promoting strong economic
growth, as stated in RPJMN (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka
Menengah/ Medium Term Development Plan) 2015 – 2019 to reach
an average of 7% in five years. However, in the short term, in
relation to the development of the global and domestic economy, the
Government are also focusing on maintaining the stability of the
Indonesian economy. The Government is aware that in the current
situation relating to the national economy, especially the limitedness
of supply in infrastructure, productivity, and other handicaps, the
１３
measures to boost economic growth may influence the stability of
the economy, internally or externally. External balance is shown by
the pressures on current account (deficit), while internally, there
will be overheating due to the significant amount of demand
indicated by the pressure of inflation.
The government’s policies in managing the economy, in general,
are divided into two, namely: State Budget (APBN) and incentive.
State Budget is executed via spending allocation and financing in an
expansive manner to boost robust and sustainable economic growth.
Meanwhile, the stabilization is done by issuing regulative and
incentive policies. Therefore, to maintain economic stabilization and
boost strong and sustainable economic growth policies assimilation
is required, whether this is the regulative and incentive or direct
allocation of spending/budget financing.
The stabilization is necessary to provide a sound foundation for
the acceleration of Indonesia’s economic growth. The policies
issued via regulative and incentive aimed at improving the current
account deficit and maintaining the stabilization of exchange rate,
are as follows. First of all, within the framework of encouraging
reinvestment on the profit made by companies as well as supporting
export rate; the government is issuing an amendment to the
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regulation of tax allowance with simpler procedures and criteria.
Tax allowance will be given to companies that are providing
employment, using local materials, export-oriented, and with high
investment. Additional incentives are provided for businesses
reinvesting the profits gained from dividends and/or implementing
research and development.
In addition, the government is issuing exemption on value added
tax to encourage logistic sectors, among others for dockyards,
equipment used in the rail industry, air transportation industry, and
similar. Moreover, to improve the competitiveness of domestic
products, the government is issuing regulation for the flexibility of
import duties on temporary anti-dumping and import duties on
temporary security measures. The policies above are in response to
the possibility of a spike in the import of certain goods, and the
simplification of procedures and returns mechanisms. Furthermore,
the tourism sector is encouraged to support the improvement in
current account deficit by adding the 45 countries listed as visa-
free. Lastly, the energy sector is invited to support the policies in
improving the use of biofuel from 10% to 15% by keeping an eye on
supply availability and competitive pricing policy.
In the budget revision of 2015, the government starting to
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reallocate the non-productive spending to the productive spending
significantly as shown in the allocation of infrastructure spending
that reached Rp290 trillion (US$21.7 billion). It was the first time
that the infrastructure allocation exceeds energy subsidy. In
addition, the government also allocated state investment for Rp70.4
trillion (US$5.3 billion) particularly to improve the State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs), and to support national infrastructure
development and economy. In the short term, it will directly and
significantly add up gross fixed capital formation (investment), and
in the long term, it is expected to create a multiplier effect for
investment and other productive activities, essential to the
acceleration of economic growth.
In the medium-long term, the government continues to
encourage strong and inclusive economic growth. Several policies to
be taken are, first of all, the improvement in budget structure. It is
aimed at improving budget by creating a larger fiscal space to
allocate sufficient budget to support high economic growth, with
several common principles. These principles are as follows:
sustainable revenue source; quality of spending – more productive
spending; and manageable fiscal deficit. In addition, government to
support real sector and investment particularly in FDI. The policies
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taken are:
1. Better and measurable incentives for investment;
2. Tax incentives for downstream industries with high added value
and export-oriented;
3. Incentives for infrastructure investment for Public Private
Partnership (PPP) and optimization of SOEs role as an agent of
development;
4. One Stop Service Center in Investment Coordination Board for
better, simpler, transparent, and integrated service on
investment.
After recovering from the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia’s
real GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 5.4%, average 2000-
2014. This growth helped to pull the poor out of poverty, which
more than halved from 24% during the crisis to 11% by 2014.
Economic growth has also facilitated the building of a stronger
middle class. There are now 45 million people, the richest 18% of
all Indonesians, who are economically secure and enjoy a higher
quality of life. They are the fastest growing group of the population,
increasing at 10 percent per year since 2002.
Nevertheless, those wealthy Indonesians who are now
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economically secure are starting to leave the other 205 million
behind. The benefits of economic growth have been enjoyed mostly
by the growing consumer class. From 2003 to 2010, consumption
per person of the richest 10% of Indonesians grew at over 6% per
year. On the contrary, the poorest 40% only grew at less than 2%
per year; this condition contributed to a slow pace of poverty
reduction. Since 2002, the number of poor people has declined by
only 2% per year, and the numbers of those vulnerable to poverty
have barely fallen at all.
Income inequality in Indonesia has reached the highest levels in
history. In 2002, the richest 10% of Indonesians consumed as much
as the poorest 42%. The condition worsened in 2014 when they
consumed as much as the poorest 54%. During the Asian financial
crisis, while poverty increased sharply, the Gini ratio fell. Everyone
was affected, but the richest group were hit the hardest by the
crisis. Since then, the Gini ratio has increased from 0.30 in 2000 to
0.41 points in 2014, which is the highest recorded level.
The government's policy to eliminate the income gap is to raise
the living standard of the bottom 40% of the population and to
ensure that poor people obtain social protection measures. These
are carried out are as follows. First of all, the governments commit
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to creating inclusive economic growth that maximizes the economic
potential to include as much of the labor force in decent work and
poor family friendly. Therefore able to encourage the improvement
of equality and reduce the income gap. The inclusive economy is
intended to drive growth in the various sectors, such as agriculture,
industry, and services which are labor intensive.
Moreover, the government aims to enlarge labor-intensive
investments. The opening of new jobs is one means of increasing
the incomes of the population. The new investment is required for
the creation of jobs and new employment opportunities to absorb
the labor force with a primary and secondary school background. In
addition, the government support microenterprises. Micro-
businesses need support in technology strengthening, marketing,
capital, and market access. Such support should be given as most
microenterprises do not have a permanent location and no legal
status, making them vulnerable to a variety of obstacles that may
hinder the potential for growth and development.
Furthermore, the government needs to ensure social protection
for informal workers. The expansion of employment opportunities
and businesses are necessary to enable disadvantaged residents
and vulnerable workers, including people with disabilities and the
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elderly. This population group have limited opportunities in the
formal sector and do not have alternative sources of income to
support their family. Fewer job opportunities are accessible to this
group of the population who are therefore less able to meet the
standards of a decent life, thus becoming unsustainable. The
integration of a variety of social assistance measures to support
this underprivileged population is necessary for them to manage the
risks, opportunities and create an inclusive environment, providing
them with a decent living and sufficient social security.
Likewise, the government urges to improve and expand basic
services for the poor. It is necessary to improve the quality of life,
especially for disadvantaged households. These basic rights include
the right to obtain identity/ legal status, health care, sufficient
nutrition, access to education, decent housing, adequate lighting,
sanitation facilities and access to drinking water. Additionally, the
government requires to expand the rural economy and to develop
the agriculture sector in a way that increases the agricultural
productivity of poor farmers, fisheries and aquacultures, and other
micro-scale enterprises that support the production chain of small
businesses; which provide potential in the region. Therefore, the
government require to improve access to land and productive assets;
２０
these are necessary to increase the output and business scale of
disadvantaged communities. The availability of facilities and
economic infrastructure in rural areas, access to financial services,
credit, and other capital sources, as well as the utilization of
agricultural research and technology, dissemination and provision of
agricultural technology information is also an important factor in
stimulating the rural economy.
Lastly, the government effort to maintain price stability and
curb inflation. The poor household groups are more vulnerable to
economic shocks than the high-income group. Therefore, inflation
needs to be maintained at a low and stable rate to sustain the
purchasing power of low-income households which are vulnerable
to price shock. In addition, there is a need to monitor food pricing
developments and to maintain the availability of basic commodities
through market operations.
2.2. The Role of Oil Sector and Fuel Subsidy
Based on the constitution, Indonesia's natural resources belong
to the government and are used in the best possible way for the
welfare of the people. The government through its state-owned
enterprise (SOE), such as Pertamina, is entrusted with the
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authority to manage natural resources, especially the oil and gas
sector. The government, as represented by Pertamina, does not
have sufficient funds to maintain all areas of oil and gas as well as
being unwilling to take the risk to fail in the exploration. Therefore,
investors are invited under the Production Sharing Contract (PSC).
Indonesia currently has 293 working areas, which consist of 74
areas of production and 219 areas of exploration.
Prior to PSC, Indonesia had embraced two contract regimes,
namely concessions and work of contract (WOC). The concession
regime was adopted in the Dutch colonial era until the beginning of
Indonesian independence. In this scheme, all of the production
within the concession is held by the company. The government only
receives royalties that are generally in the form of a percentage of
gross revenue and tax. Therefore, the government involvement is
very limited.
WOC regime prevailed around the first half of the 1960s. This
regime provided oil and gas resources that belonged to the
government. The status of the oil company was derived from the
concession holder to become a government contractor. In this
system, the government and the companies share the proceeds of
oil and gas. The oil company still holds control of management,
２２
while the role of government is limited to a supervisory capacity.
PSC scheme first came into force in 1966. The implementation
of the PSC was motivated by the government desire to play a bigger
role in the management of oil and gas upstream activities. In the
PSC scheme, the government was the owner of the resources,
which mandated the management of the resources to oil and gas
companies. In the upstream oil and gas business, oil and gas
companies both domestic and foreign had to provide funds and
equipment. However, all of the expenses had to be approved by the
government, because the capital would be restored later when the
production ran. This replacement, in the world of oil and gas
business, is known as cost recovery and is only done if there is a
finding of commercial reserves to be developed. Otherwise, all
costs are borne entirely by oil and gas companies. When production
starts, the production output will be deducted in advance with the
capital to be returned to the oil company, and the rest of the output
is then split between the government and oil companies by the
agreements in the contract. With this PSC scheme, the government
utilized oil and gas resources with capital and technology provided
by the investor. On the other hand, the government is not exposed
to the risk of failure of exploration, because the cost of capital in
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the explorations is not replaced in the scheme of cost recovery. In
this sense, the government has a control both on the operational
management and the ownership of oil and gas resources.
The oil and gas sector, in this case, are the oil and gas mining
subsector and the oil manufacturing subsector which was
consistently shrinking from 2000 to 2014. In 2000, the share of the
oil and gas sector was 12.3% of GDP, in 2014 it was only 4.5% (see
Figure 1). The decline in oil and gas industry performance directly
translates to the government budget as a decrease in the realization
of Indonesian crude oil production throughout the decade of the
2000s. In 2000, the oil production was still above 1 million barrels
per day (mbpd), but each year the crude oil production shrunk by
an average of 3.6 per year. Up to 2014, the oil production only
reached 0.818 mbpd.
The decline in oil production came from the fact that most of
the oil field in operation is matured. The government proposed the
use of new technology to encourage the production of oil and gas,
but this strategy only seemed to slow the decline of oil production.
An incentive policy was given to encourage the discovery of new oil
field, such as the rules simplification and deregulations to support
the acceleration of ready-to-produce oil fields. The discovery of
２４
new oil fields requires serious effort in terms of capital,
accompanied by high uncertainty. As an alternative, the government
expects that the production of natural gas will be able to replace the
role of crude oil.
Figure 1 Oil and Gas Sector Performance
Due to a decrease in crude oil production, Indonesia left OPEC
in 2008. The ratio between crude oil production and fuel
consumption also continued to decline. In 1990, the ratio reached
205%, then in 2000 came down to 128% and then dropped to 58%
in 2011. Along with an increase in energy consumption in the oil
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net oil importer with the amount of oil imported reaching 850
thousand barrels per day in 2014.
The provision of fuel in Indonesia is the monopoly of Pertamina
to manage the oil industry. Pertamina receives a Public Service
Obligation (PSO) task from the government to provide fuel at a
price controlled by the government. In carrying out its PSO,
Pertamina receives a subsidy from the government when its
revenue from selling fuel is lower than the provision cost. Other
private oil companies are allowed to produce and sell unsubsidized
fuel domestically.
There are two major groups of subsidies; these are energy
subsidies and non-energy subsidies. Energy subsidies are divided
into two, namely fuel subsidy and electricity subsidy. The fuel
subsidy seized the largest share, 49.0% of the total subsidy
(average 2007-2015), while the share of electricity subsidy was
28.3%. Non-energy subsidy consisted of the fertilizer subsidy
(8.3%), food subsidy (6.7%), tax subsidies (5.3%), credit program
subsidy (1.1%), public service obligation subsidy (0.8%) and seeds
subsidy (0.5%).
The amount of allocated subsidy has a tendency to increase
from year to year. In 2003, total subsidy was only Rp55.6 trillion
２６
(US$4.1 billion), in the following years, the number was
continuously increased, reaching a peak in 2014 of Rp246.5 trillion
(US$34.0 billion) (see Figure 2). In 2015 the value dropped to
US$15.9 billion when the government diverted the fuel subsidy for
various welfare programs and infrastructures development.
Increased volatility in oil prices, especially during 2004-05 and
2008, has made spending on fuel subsidies difficult to predict,
resulting in spending realization exceeding the original budget in 6
out of the last seven years. In 2008, fuel subsidies were three
times more than that which was originally budgeted.














Uncertainty about the ultimate size of fuel subsidies created
risks for public finances in the past. It led to uncertainty about the
government’s ultimate financing needs and bonds issuance plans
for the year as well as in relation to the outlook for inflation, thus
raising the cost of borrowing. The cost of the Indonesian
Government’s debt is correlated to the gap between regulated and
market prices for fuel. Debt markets charge a premium when
subsidies are expanding. Government bonds yield that move in
tandem with oil prices that are not unique to Indonesia. However,
the movements in Indonesia’s yields appear to be particularly
pronounced, and can take longer than average to return to normal
levels after an oil price rally.
Furthermore, the government bonds deals are also highly
sensitive to how the Indonesian Government manages domestic
regulated fuel prices. As the gap between Indonesian fuel prices
and international fuel prices widens, speculation over whether the
Government will raise fuel prices – which temporarily increases
inflation – can contribute to a marked rise in Indonesia’s bond
yields. For example, in 2005 and 2008, the 5-year bond yield rose
by over five percentage points to almost 16 percent in a matter of
months.
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The policy to maintain fuel subsidies within the budget makes
government finances uncertain. During the previous administration,
revenue and expenditure were always increased in the revised
budget, one of the reasons being the revision of the amount of
subsidy, but in the 2015 budget revision, revenue and expenditure
were lowered because subsidy was cut and tax revenue was below
the targets. In the 2015 original budget, state revenue is set at
Rp1793.6 trillion (US$134.23 billion) and expenditure of Rp2039.5
trillion (US$152.63 billion). Then in budget revision, the revenues
lowered to Rp1761.6 trillion (US$131.84 billion), while spending is
trimmed to Rp1984.1 trillion (US$148.49 billion). Nevertheless, the
revenues realization remain far below the target, which is only
Rp1504.5 trillion (US$112.60 billion), or 85.4 percent of the target.
As for the expenditure, government disbursed Rp1810.0 trillion
(US$135.55 billion) or 91.2 percent of the target.
One of the causes of non-fulfillment of government revenue is
the low production of Indonesian crude oil. If the oil production is
below the target, it affects the amount of revenue derived from the
sales of crude oil, namely oil and gas income tax revenue, non-tax
revenues from natural resources, and regional oil and gas revenue
sharing. Such factors and the increase in world crude oil prices, also
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the exchange rate depreciation, forced the government to adjust
fuel price irregularly in the period during 2000-2011 to reduce
fiscal pressure. The pressure on the 2015 state budget can be
derived from the possibility of a shortfall of tax revenue due to
slowing economic performance; the possibility of expanding fuel
subsidies mainly due to the depreciation of the exchange rate; and
high oil prices up to the first three-quarters of 2014. These
pressures have encouraged the Government to pursue budget cuts.
Historically, to reduce fiscal pressure, for the first time in 2001,
the government deregulated fuel prices. The deregulation is
intended to improve industrial competitiveness and also aims to
improve the budget allocation targeted at the poor. In principle, this
policy stated fuel price discrimination based on the type of
consumers. The retail fuel price to household, land and sea
transportation and small businesses is regulated by the government.
On the other hand, the retail price of fuel for industry and fishing
vessels is set at 50% of the international price. In 2003 the
government fully deregulated fuel prices for the industries,
fisheries, mining, foreign-flagged vessels and ships with overseas
destinations. The price of fuel for previously mentioned consumers is
similar to international prices. Household, land and water transportation
and small businesses are entitled to a subsidized price.
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In addition to the fiscal burden and the risks of the fuel subsidy
system, there is also a concern that the subsidies are not meeting
the objective of assisting the poorer segments of the population
who most need such support. The World Bank (2011) estimates
based on the data of Indonesia’s National Household
Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS, Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional)
indicate that households or private users may consume as little as
one-third of all subsidized fuel. The rest of it potentially
attributable to commercial users such as transport operators,
businesses, and other users. With respect to individual fuels,
estimates indicate that households consumed almost half of
subsidized gasoline in 2008, implying that commercial and other
users consumed the remaining half.
Furthermore, a breakdown of the household component of
gasoline consumption by socio-economic group indicates that the
top half of households by consumption accounted for 84 percent,
with the highest consumption decile alone accounts for almost 40
percent. In contrast, the poor and near-poor (defined as the bottom
five deciles) accounted for just 16 percent, with the poorest decile
account for less than 1 percent. Moreover, a detailed examination of
reported fuel consumption in the household survey indicates that
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around two-thirds of poor and near-poor households do not
consume any gasoline whatsoever, although the likelihood of
consuming gasoline and the actual quantity consumed rises with
wealth status. With respect to diesel, very few households report
any consumption. Therefore, commercial and other users are
estimated to account for virtually all (98 percent) consumption of
subsidized diesel. The gasoline subsidy is the most regressive,
meaning it benefits the rich disproportionately more than the
poorest households, as expected given limited ownership of
motorcycles and virtually no car ownership amongst poor and near-
poor households.
Subsidy reform is a sensitive policy issue. However, the
experience of other countries and Indonesia’s experience
demonstrates that ambitious change is possible even during times of
crisis. Where it has been successful, subsidy reform has often been
accompanied by, first of all, a compensation package to assist the
poorest and most vulnerable. Furthermore, increased spending on
priorities which attract broad public support, such as education,
health, public transport, and infrastructure. Lastly, a public
information campaign to raise public awareness of the costs and
implications of the current system and the benefits of reform, as
well as to alleviate public and investor concerns about the proposed
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changes.
The government irregularly adjusted the retail fuel price by
reducing the amount of subsidy. The most substantial subsidy
reduction occurred in 2005 which had a widespread impact upon
Indonesian households, especially the poor (see Azis, 2006),
because, in addition to the rising price of energy, a spillover was
created due to the increasing cost of necessities. Reduction of fuel
subsidies impacted on household welfare due to their dependence
on energy and transportation costs, which is reflected in their
consumption patterns. Poor households that do not have enough
savings face difficulty in adjusting their consumption as a reaction
to rising prices. According to data released by BPS, the number of
poor people has increased from 16.0% to 17.8% in the 2005-2006
period. At that time the government initiated mitigation measures
with a compensation policy of fuel subsidy reductions, which
included cash transfers, health insurance, subsidized education and
infrastructure development in rural areas.
In June 2013 and November 2014, in response to high
international oil prices and a weak Rupiah, Indonesia raised
subsidized fuel prices by 30 percent or more. As in the previous
years (e.g., 2005 and 2008), in 2013 a temporary unconditional
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cash transfer (Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat, BLSM)
was implemented to compensate the poor and vulnerable. In 2014,
President Joko Widodo increased fuel prices immediately after
taking office. The policy also accompanied by six monthly BLSM
payments as compensation to the poor. In 2015, the government
took a bold step in fiscal policy to support a sounder state budget.
In order to improve the efficiency of government spending, the
government cut the fuel subsidy through fuel price adjustment. The
applications of fixed subsidy for diesel fuel, as well as the
elimination of subsidies for regular gasoline, started in early 2015.
The Policy aimed to increase fiscal space for more productive
programs and also to minimize the fiscal vulnerability caused by
fluctuating crude oil prices and Rupiah exchange rates.
Fuel price adjustments are part of the measures put in place to
improve the mechanism of for a better-targeted subsidy and part of
the structural reform of the Indonesian economy. Subsidized fuel
price adjustment will push inflation and in turn, depress purchasing
power. The government needs to mitigate the impact of fuel price
adjustment policy in the form of compensation programs and other
social programs, especially with regard to education and health.
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2.3. Infrastructure Policy
The lack of infrastructure has created a bottleneck issue in
relation to supply which has shackled the Indonesian economy to
grow high. Improvements to infrastructure focused on the efforts to
improve national connectivity, therefore, increasing domestic
integration to improve economic efficiency and flow of goods and
services between regions in Indonesia.
A recent World Bank (2016) survey of manufacturers across
Indonesia’s major agglomerations shows a breakdown of logistical
costs. Average total logistical costs reflect transport and
container-handling costs (45% of the total), inventory costs (26%),
warehousing (17%) and logistics administration (17%). Inventory
costs are clearly much higher than those for some of Indonesia’s
competitors: these are only 13% of total costs in Malaysia and 16%
in Thailand.
In addition, surveys show that Indonesian firms incur
substantial indirect costs due to poor logistics, gaps in
infrastructure and restrictive licensing and permitting procedures.
Those condition put firms located in Indonesia at a disadvantage to
their peers operating in other countries where these costs are
lower. Measures to reduce these costs, as well as improved trade
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facilitation and a reduction of non-tariff measures, are especially
important in a context of growing global value chain integration
where efficient importing is critical to export success. Good
logistics are a vital prerequisite for supplying domestic markets
efficiently and competing internationally. High inventory costs
reflect uncertainties in the supply chain. A key source of
uncertainty lies in hinterland connections. The costs of bringing
containers to Jakarta’s main port, Tanjung Priok, are double those
in Malaysia, although distances are similar. A survey of 83 trucking
firms operating in Greater Jakarta highlights why: prolonged idle
and waiting times due to congestion; long queuing at the port, and
low efficiency in synchronizing cargo deliveries and pick-ups.
In the period from 1990-2013, additional road lengths for all
types of surface (excluding highways) averaged only 2.5% per year,
while the growth of asphalted roads was relatively higher, on
average 3.7% per year. The growth of highway roads also did not
differ, which averaged only 3.5% per year, even at the end of 2013
the length of toll roads in Indonesia did not reach 1000 kilometers
(see Table 1).
In the period from 2010-2014, the government constructed
1268 kilometers of national roads and 45.59 kilometers of highways.
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Thus the total length of national roads which has been built up in
2014 was 39838 kilometers. The following is the list of ongoing
road infrastructure projects on the country border region. The
Kalimantan Border Parallel Roads have connected along 42.07
kilometers from the planned 1755 kilometers. The East Nusa
Tenggara - Republic of Timor-Leste Border Roads have been
constructed for 54.2 kilometers out of the planned 877 kilometers.
The accelerated development in Papua and West Papua, including
the Papua Border Road, has resulted in 102 kilometers.
Table 1 Road Stock (unit: kilometers)
Period All type Asphalted Highway
1990-1994 356,878 164,866 519
1995-1999 355,951 203,374 564
2000-2004 372,929 206,444 564
2005-2009 476,337 271,230 698
2010-2013 502,724 287,925 763
Sources: Bureau of Indonesian Statistics (BPS) and Toll Road Regulatory Agency
(BPJT)
In order to support national connectivity, during the period
2010-2014, the main corridor on the islands of Sumatra, Java,
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, and Papua,
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among others, have been subject to the completion of an
assessment of the East Sumatera Line, North Java Line, Southern
Kalimantan Line, and West Sulawesi Line. Meanwhile, to encourage
national industries and services, the handling of the road network is
applied for Java Island. In addition, to support the center for
production and processing of mines and national energy sources,
handling road network continued on Kalimantan Island. Furthermore,
to support the center for production and processing of mines and
national energy sources, handling road network continued on
Kalimantan Island. Moreover, to support the center for production
and processing of agriculture, horticulture, fisheries and mining,
road network handling has taken place on the island of Sulawesi.
Also, to support the region of tourism gateway, handling the road
network is carried out on the island of Bali and Nusa Tenggara.
Lastly, to support the food development center, fisheries, energy
and mining, road network handling has been carried out in the
Maluku Islands and Papua.
Infrastructure provisions are directed to reduce inequalities
between income groups and regions, through the development of
productive economic infrastructure and development of roads in the
border region. To reduce regional disparities, in 2015 the
３８
government reallocated fuel subsidy to the construction of road
infrastructure and road construction in the border region of
Kalimantan and East Nusa Tenggara. There is also the construction
of infrastructure connectivity in the form of the highway
(government portion liabilities, usually for land acquisition) and the
construction of access roads to the ports of Sorong, Kuala Tanjung,
and Maloy. In addition, the central government also allocated an
additional transfer fund of DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus/ Special
Allocation Fund) for road transportation. The road provision intend
to increase connectivity and accessibility in the border areas and
underdeveloped regions as well as to reduce disparities between
the western and eastern areas of Indonesia, which included the
construction, improvement, rehabilitation or maintenance of roads
and bridges under the authority of the regional government. In the
2015-2019 National Medium Term Development Plan (Rancangan
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/ RPJMN), the government
plan to allocate Rp805 trillion (US$60.25 billion) for roads
infrastructure provision.
The government has an ambitious plan to close the
infrastructure gap in the years to come. It started in September
2015, to address regulatory restrictions through a series of policy
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packages. Provision of infrastructure in Indonesia is sluggish
because of obstacles encountered at various project stages from
preparation to execution. As a whole, poor coordination among
stakeholders often delays the decision-making process. At the
preparation stage, problems usually arise as a result of low quality
in project preparation and constraints associated with the allocation
of funds. Similarly, projects are often hindered by problems in land
acquisition, resulting in delays in achieving financial closure of PPP
(Public Private Partnership) projects. Furthermore, from a financial
perspective, the unavailability of fiscal support caused by
inconsistency or disagreement on equal risk sharing mechanisms
between the government and business entities is another constraint
that often emerges. In addition to financial support, limitations on
guarantees provided by the government for infrastructure projects
also reduces interest in investment in Indonesia.
The government has taken corrective measures to overcome
the obstacles with regard to regulatory, fiscal, and institutional
aspects. In 2014 the Government formed the Committee for
Acceleration of Priority Infrastructure Delivery (KPPIP) charged
with leading coordination to accelerate priority infrastructure and
promoting improvement in the quality of project preparation. These
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corrective measures are further supported by the increasing
capacity of the Ministry of National Development Planning
(Bappenas) in providing facilities for project preparation. It then
continued by the PPP Unit at the Ministry of Finance that provides
Project Development Facility (PDF) and Transaction Advisory for
PPP projects to increase investors’ interests in funding the projects.
In addition, to surmount obstacles to land procurement, regulation
has also been issued for the purpose of accelerating the land
acquisition process for the public interest. This particular regulation
is equipped with derivative regulations that have been revised as
needed.
Considering that government support is pivotal to attract
investment of business entities, the government also issued
regulations to provide Viability Gap Funding (VGF) and availability
payment. In order to bolster this government support, guarantees
provided by the government have been expanded to allow State
Owned Enterprises (SOE) that are assigned within the structural
development, to receive such a guarantee.
In 2015, the government actively drew up and issued Economic
Policy Packages encompassing improvements to policies and
regulations to boost Indonesia’s economy. From a fiscal policy point
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of view, the government has provided a direct lending facility for
State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and an availability payment facility
taken from APBN (the State Budget). These measures are
expected to improve the feasibility of projects.
On November 23rd, 2016, Finance Minister Sri Mulyani
Indrawati presented a tax amnesty for the profession of legal
services in Jakarta and stated that Rp1 trillion of government
expenditure could build roads of 155 kilometer length; this
information is used in conducting the policy simulation in this
research. Meanwhile, according to the Toll Road Regulatory Agency
(Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol/BPJT), toll road provision costs in
Indonesia ranged between Rp80-100 billion (US$5.99-7.48 million)
per kilometer, except the toll road over the sea in Bali, cost more to
reach Rp200 billion (US$14.97 million) per kilometer.
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Chapter 3. Literature Review
3.1. Impact of Fiscal Policy to Economic Growth and Income
Distribution
In the discussion on economic policy, fiscal policy is mainly
regarded as an instrument to mitigate short-run shocks of output
and employment. By changing the composition of government
spending or revenue, fiscal policy aims to alter aggregate demand to
redirect the economy closer to its potential output. However, the
capabilities of each fiscal policy in reducing output fluctuations are
different. Lucas (1988) in his paper on endogenous growth argued
that government investment in education is improving human capital.
Education enhances the capability of labor as one factor of
production and in turn, output also increased. Another example of
government spending that could affect economic growth is
infrastructure investment (Barro, 1990), research and development
expenditures (Romer, 1990), and health expenditures (Bloom et al.,
2001).
On the revenue side, taxes are known to distort the behavior of
economic actors. Economic actors will consider the effect of taxes
on their decision about the accumulation of capital and product
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supply. Accumulation of capital affect investment, while turnover
product affects consumption, both of them directly affect the GDP.
A number of studies were attempted to examine the
relationship between subsidy and economics performance. Ikhsan et
al. (2005) studied cutting Indonesian fuel subsidy in 2005 and found
that if fuel subsidies were decreased without compensation to the
poor, the poverty index would increase from 16.3% to 16.7%. Zhang
(1998) studied the impact of subsidy using CGE on the
environmental aspect such a carbon emission. He analyzed the
macroeconomic effects of limiting China's CO2 emissions by using a
time-recursive dynamic CGE model of the Chinese economy. He
found that large reductions in carbon emissions can only be
achieved by higher increases in carbon taxes and thus, prices of
fossil fuels. Furthermore, carbon emission limitations tend to
decrease aggregate gross production, where the coal sector is
severely affected.
In the case of another country, such as Yemen, Breisinger et al.
(2012) showed that overall growth effects of fuel subsidy reduction
are positive in general, but poverty can increase or decrease
depending on reform design. Reform without compensation raises
poverty rates up to 2.6 percentage points while reforming with
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compensation of direct cash transfers to the poorest one-third of
households will reduce the poverty rate up to 4 percentage points.
Studies about infrastructure provision also one of the major
topics using CGE analysis (Lee and Kim, 2015). Applied his
previous work of Kim and Bae (2015), Kim et al. (2016) developed
Financial CGE model that analyzes the economic impacts of
infrastructure investment projects and their financing options on
growth and income distribution in the Indonesian economy. The
model analyzed the economic effects of fiscal policies such as the
transportation investment expenditures and alternative procurement
approaches, linking the investment expenditures with specific
financial resources. The construction location and the changes in
the accessibility generated by the project are injected into the
model. The simulations on the Indonesian transportation projects
revealed that using tax revenues as the source of project financing
generated higher effects on GDP than other financing sources.
Previously, Kim et al. (2011) examined the impacts of highway
development regarding how they were financed. The results
indicated that imposing regional earmarked taxes had larger effects
on income growth and the reduction of regional income inequality
than the existing tax system. Most papers showed positive impacts
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of the investments on productivities and cost reductions, for
instance, Kim and Shin (2002) found that an increase of the road
capital stock by 1 per cent in Korea could lead to a reduction of
production cost of the manufacturing sector by 0.012%. Duffy-Deno
and Eberts (1991) using data for US metropolitan showed that both
public investment and the public capital stock had positive effects
on per capita income through two channels that are the actual
construction of public capital in the demand side, and of an unpaid
factor (for using public capital) in the production process.
On the contrary, there are also some papers against the
economic contribution of the infrastructure to growth. Berechman
(1994) revealed its negative effect on economic growth, and Kim
(1998) examined that the infrastructure investment policy
beneficial to economic growth, but also boosting the price inflation.
Moreover, Pereira (2001) found that the public investment might
crowd out the private investments in the sector of information
equipment, while the crowding-in effects of public investment might
be significant in the industrial sector and transportation equipment
sector.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this subsection are, the
fiscal policy usually used to dampen the impact of short-term
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economic fluctuations or change the behavior of economic agents in
the long term. Policies related to subsidy cuts or carbon limitation
has a tendency to lower aggregate output, which, if it is not
mitigated would increase poverty rate. Lastly, investment in
infrastructure development, in general, will increase output,
however, the magnitude of the output increase depends on the
source of the financing, since it can potentially cause a crowding out
of private investment.
3.2. Structure of CGE Model
The CGE model can be defined as an economic model which
consists of linkages between income groups, patterns of demand,
the balance of payments and multi-sector production structure. The
model includes a set of behavioral equations describing the behavior
of economic agents and their technological and institutional
constraints. The model is in general equilibrium, meaning that the
set of prices and quantities exists and all excess demands for
commodities and services in nominal and real value are zero.
The most innovative technique of CGE is that the model is free
from the linearity constraints unlike other predecessor models
(Iqbal and Siddiqui: 2001). According to Adelman and Robinson
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(1978), it is not the objective of CGE model to forecast the exact
outcome of policy measures but to provide only an indication of the
direction and size of the effects.
The CGE models consist of three information structures,
namely analytical, functional and numerical (Iqbal and Siddiqui:
2001). The analytical structure is the underlying theory of variable
interest and hypothesizes their causal relationship. The functional
structure is a mathematical representation of the analytical material
consisting of an algebraic equation. The numerical structure
consists of the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients in the
functional structure equation.
In the literature, there are three layers of classifications of CGE
models based on their historical development and the intended use
of the model. The first classification is based on the historical
development; these are Macro model versus Walrasian model. The
macro model develops from the multi-sector analysis carried out in
the 1970s; it is often used in policy analysis in developing countries.
The Walrasian CGE model developed from the general equilibrium
framework of Walras, popularized by the work of Scarf (1967) on
the Walrasian computation of equilibrium price. The second
classification is based on the theoretical economy uses in the model,
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of which there are two groups, the neoclassical closure versus the
other closure. Economists classified the Walrasian model as
belonging to neoclassical closure. The third classification is based
on techniques used in the determination of the parameters; these
are calibration techniques versus econometric estimation.
However, CGE models are usually distinguished based on
closure rule. The use of closure also distinguishes between
neoclassical models and structuralist models. The neoclassical
models use savings driven closures, meaning that the amount of
investment is determined by the amount of savings, while in the
structuralist models, investment has its own function. In addition, in
neoclassical models, it is assumed that there is a full employment
condition, while in the structuralist model there is a possible
existence of unemployment.
Figure 3 Classification of CGE Modeling
In order to understand the differences between the uses of
closure in building a CGE model, the following are illustrations taken





Macro other closure econometric
adapted from Thissen (1998)
CGE Model
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from a simple closed economy by Dewatripont and Michel (1987). It
supposes that the economy has only three goods, these are
"consumption good," "labor," and "money." There are four agents
"government," "capitalist household," "labor household" and "firm."
As a simplification, the government is supplying the money to
finance its exogenous consumption.
Production = ( , ) (1)
Labor demand ( , ) = / (2)
Exogenous investment = ̅ (3)
Consumption = ( / ) + ( / )Π (4)
Labor supply = (5)
Goods market equilibrium = + ̅ + ̅ (6)
Labor market equilibrium = (7)
Where Y is production, ƒ is production function, K is fixed capital
stock, is labor demand, is labor supply, p is goods price, w is
wage rate, cl is marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wages
wL, cπ is marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of profit π.
This simple model has two market equilibrium conditions which
are the equilibrium in the goods market and the equilibrium in the
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labor market; the money market equilibrium is neglected by Walras'
law. By combining and substituting equations (1) to (7), the
reduced equilibrium condition is derived as follows.
= ( / ) (8)
( , ) = ( / ) + ̅ + ̅ (9)
Equation (8) and (9) which are a summary of this simple model
clearly show the closure problem. There are two equilibrium
conditions, but there is only one independent variable that is w/p, in
other words, this system of equations is over-determined.
Therefore, one equation must be relaxed to find a solution. In
summary, choosing a particular closure means to determine which
conditions must be dropped.
The Keynesian closure allows for unemployment. Therefore
equation (5) is dropped and replaces with L which later became
endogenous in systems (8) and (9). Kaldorian closure breaks the
equality between wage and marginal labor productivity, for that,
equation (8) is replaced by ( , ) ≥ / and ≤ , then the
system is solved w/p and L endogenously. Johansen closure wipes
away equation (4), and assumes that full employment equilibrium is
realized by means of residual adjustment for consumption C in the
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system (8)—(9). Finally, the Classical closure can be seen as a
system with endogenous investment, equation (8)—(9) then solved
for w/p and I. The other way is to add a new variable that is the
interest rate r on consumption and investment scheme, thus the
system (8)—(9) would solve for w/p and r.
Neoclassical economists usually select Classical closure, while
structuralists tend to use Keynesian closure. The choice of closure
is very influential on the model structure and policy conclusions.
The most important point of the selection algorithm solution is that
the choosing of closure can lead to different implications in the
evaluation of the impact of alternatives policy in the CGE model
simulations. For example, the level of output in the neoclassical
approach is nearly constant even though the simulation is presented
in the form of a severe external shock. Therefore, this neoclassical
specification does not fit for simulating the effect of external shocks
in short-term or medium-term, but it might be suitable for
exploring government policies for a dynamic long-term model.
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3.3. Application of Financial CGE Model
Financial Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) can be
defined as an extension of traditional (real) CGE models with the
interaction linkages between financial side and real side of the
economy. The inclusion of the financial sector into the standard
CGE real side is necessary to allow experimentation using
instrumental policies that affect the financial variable.
In the standard CGE models that do not include the financial
sector, or more precisely the financial instrument, the only wealth
in that real closed system is just capital stock. Saving is directly
linked to the purchase of investment goods through the implicit
process or, in another word, the decision to save is directly
translated into capital investment because there is no other medium
to store wealth. The standard CGE model cannot capture the effect
of the decision to allocate portfolios in the real variable because the
behavioral rules in the wealth allocation process of the private
sector are not specified in the models.
The models of Adelman and Robinson (1978) for South Korea
can be considered as an early FCGE model because it includes the
market for loanable funds and currency that clears the equilibrium
interest rate and the price level. However, in their model
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specifications, the price level has no effect on output and
employment and therefore did not affect real balance. Inflation is
merely a monetary symptom and has no effect on the real economy.
The milestone of the modern financial CGE model was
disseminated by the double work of Robinson (1991) and
Thorbecke (1991) in World Development, Vol. 19, No. 11. Robinson
(1991) incorporated the loanable funds market consisting of
currency, demand deposits, time deposits, government debt,
domestic bonds, foreign bonds, equity, real capital and working
capital into the Financial SAM. Previously, scholars such as Lewis
(1985), Rosenweig and Taylor (1990), Feltenstein (1984),
Feltenstein (1986), and Feltenstein and Morris (l988) had already
introduced assets and asset markets into CGE models, where an
interest rate acts as an equilibrating variable. However, these
models’ dynamic behavior is very limited; there is no uncertainties
and specification of portfolio behavior on the part of asset holders is
very simple. Subsequently, the financial CGE is widely used by
researchers in analyzing government policy.
Taylor and Rosensweig (1984) models for Thailand focused on
the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policy, the inclusion of a
more diverse financial side with a portfolio decision of banks, firms,
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and households. The model is Keynesian, indicated by the inclusion
of unemployment and fixed nominal wages. The expansionist fiscal
policy, although financed by domestic borrowing, generates high
growth. The income effect of saving is huge and dominates the
effect of government borrowing, inducing a crowding-in effect for
investment. In contrast, fiscal restraints have a huge recessive
impact, while monetary contraction raises interest rates, reduces
investment and national income. Furthermore, inflation has no
adverse effect on the real economy side. Thus it reduces the role of
monetary policy as a stabilization instrument.
The paper from Thorbecke (1991) can be considered as an
earlier study using an FCGE method with Indonesian cases. The
paper discussed the impact of the stabilization and structural
adjustment of a policy package implemented in Indonesia during
1982 to 1988 following the drop in oil prices, and its effects on
income distribution, internal and external equilibrium.
In his research, Thorbecke (1991) used real side SAM with the
dimension of a 51x51 matrix, consisting of factors of production
(four labor categories and five kinds of capital); institutions (eight
socioeconomic household groups and companies); 14 production
activities; government expenditures (four types of government
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current expenditure); government investment (eight types of
government capital expenditures by sector of destination); total
government current accounts; total government capital accounts;
private capital; rest of the world; trade and transport margins;
indirect taxes; and subsidies. There is also a separate financial side
SAM that consist of eight households and companies, 5 other
institutions (firms, commercial banks, the central bank, government,
and the rest of the world) and financial assets portfolio (currency,
demand deposits, time deposits, foreign deposits, equity, and
foreign bonds). Nevertheless, the financial side SAM was not
disclosed in the paper.
Thorbecke (1991) runs through six alternative policy scenarios
which are: budget cuts; increased public investment and reduced
current expenditure; reduced public investment and increased
current expenditure; accelerated devaluation; and monetary
contraction or expansion. He revealed that budget cuts are
deflationary and GDP growth is lower than base case, real incomes
for all socioeconomic groups are also lower. Moreover, allocating
more to public investment entails a lower stream of aggregate
consumption in the short term for larger streams of incomes and
consumption in the long run. On the contrary, maintaining high
５６
levels of government current expenditure shelters household
incomes in the short term but results in lower growth rates and a
contraction of incomes and consumption in the long run.
Furthermore, accelerated devaluation encourages exports and
discourages imports in the long run; the improved balance of
payments, thus reduces the government’s foreign borrowing;
inflationary which in turn encourage capital flight; higher GDP
growth as a result of the favorable balance of payments. Farmers
who produce much of the exported crops benefit from the increase
in the prices of tradable goods. However, all other household groups
are unfavorably affected.
Additionally, monetary contraction is deflationary, though GDP
growth is unaffected in the short term but falls in the long run. The
current account of the balance of payments improves mainly
because of the slowdown in import demand. Moreover, the
distributional consequences are generally neutral. On the contrary,
a monetary expansion is inflationary, boosts GDP growth slightly in
the short term and marginally in the long run; where the
distributional impact is neutral, the current account is worsening
and a switch from the traditional flow of net private lending abroad
to net private borrowing abroad.
５７
The Turkey FCGE model from Lewis (1992) is a structuralist
model highlighting premium rationing of imports, working capital
financing by firms, segmented credit markets, interest rate controls,
and monetization of fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits. It is
focused on labor rigidities, product and credit markets in analyzing
the economic performance from the impact of external shock.
However, the model uses several policy instruments that cannot be
distinguished from the fiscal and monetary policy. Li (2010) model
of China can be classified as a “Classical” FCGE model. The
system determines the exchange rate, covering fixed, partially
flexible and completely flexible exchange rate systems to consider
the effect of international oil price changes. OECD model of
Bourguignon et al. (1992) have more qualified specifications of a
financial CGE with the inclusion of imperfect adjustment of wages to
inflation, and the expectations formation related to inflation and
devaluation.
Yeldan (1997) conducted a simulation to determine the impact
on the real economy of the Turkish financial liberalization reforms
in the 1980s. He found that the government's mode of financing its
fiscal deficit through debt instrument or monetization has significant
diverse effects on real output, employment, and the movement of
５８
the interest and the foreign exchange rates. In the case of credit
market failure, the government can take fiscal policy measures such
as the provision of credit directed to certain sectors. Naastepad
(2001), conducted a study on a similar subject, for the case of India,
she found that in the short and medium-term simulations, macro-
economic effects of directed credit to the agriculture sector and
small industries are likely to be significant and positive for the
Indian economy.
Liu et al. (2015) studied monetary policy responses to oil price
shocks. The idea was to identify the optimal monetary policies
aiming at an inflation target. They found that when tolerance for
inflation is high, then interest rate policy alone is sufficient, but,
while tolerance for inflation is low; and the government prefers on
social stability and household welfare, then reserve ratio policy
should also be implemented in addition to interest rate policy.
Furthermore, they stated that if the world oil price increases by
100% and the inflation target are below 2%, then monetary
authorities should raise the interest rate and reserve ratios by 2.5
and 3.0 percentage points, respectively.
From the review above, it can be concluded the following
matters. Firstly, there was an interval of 18 years since CGE model
５９
first introduced by Johansen (1960) to Adelman and Robinson
(1978) model, which managed to combine the financial side with the
real side in general equilibrium model. Those initial FCGE model,
although it has included financial instruments where the interest
rate acts an equilibrating variable in the model specification, the
price level has no effect on output and employment. Secondly,
papers of Robinson (1991) and Thorbecke (1991) can be
considered as the foundation of modern FCGE models, since it
contains information that is sufficiently detailed to build this
complex model. Thirdly, Table 2 showed that besides serving as a
simulation tool for structural adjustment and stabilization policies,
FCGE models widely used for the analysis of the impact of external
shock such as rising international commodity prices, oil for instance.
Another external impact is the rising of lender countries’ interest
rates. Kim et al. (2016) innovated the uses of FCGE models in
assessing the feasibility of infrastructure projects based on sources
of financing and transportation accessibility, already discussed in
Subchapter 3.1.
６０
Table 2 Application of the FCGE Model






























































































3.4. Development of CGE Model in Indonesia
The paper from Gelb (1985), which assessed the impact of oil
windfall profits is one of the earliest empirical studies of Indonesia
using a CGE model. The model is 20 years dynamic, has six
industrial sectors, dualistic economy, and has three institutions
(firms, single representative household, and the government). It
then followed by a study from Devarajan and Lewis (1989), which
discussed the structural adjustment and economic reform in
Indonesia using a 13-sector CGE model. Behrman et al. (1989)
analyzed the impact of price fluctuations in international markets for
primary products on the Indonesian economy using a static CGE
model. They found that there is no case for price instability impact,
only good or only bad. Usually, GDP and investment are decreased,
and usually, real consumption and foreign reserves (in a fixed
exchange rate) are increased.
Entering the 1990s, Devarajan et al. (1993) again took the case
of Indonesia in the application of a simple CGE model which they
called 1-2-3 models or one country, two-activity, and three-
commodity. They applied the model in discussing the approaches to
determining the equilibrium of real exchange rate in a country after
external shocks. They claimed that a simple 1-2-3 model is a
６２
generalization of the Salter-Swan models, which incorporates
imperfect substitutes for both imports and exports and provides a
practical way to estimate the changes in the equilibrium of a real
exchange rate. Moreover, the 1-2-3 model requires less
information than is required to produce PPP (Purchasing Power
Parity) calculations.
Resosudarmo and Thorbecke (1996) performed a study with an
environmental aspect regarding the policy of air pollution
restrictions on output and income distribution. In their study, they
expand a social accounting matrix to include the link from the
economy to the environment, and vice versa, exploring the
relationship between production activities, pollution, and human
health problems. They found that if the policies designed to reduce
the amount of pollutants in the air did not decrease the output of
production sectors, then the policies also improve income
distribution.
In the study of finding Dalton - improving tax and expenditure
reform, Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996) also applied CGE models in the
case of Indonesia. They applied the method to the energy sector of
Indonesia, which is characterized by high gasoline taxes and high
kerosene subsidies, and they found that if the concerns are
６３
efficiency, then it suggest the distortionary tax of gasoline and
kerosene subsidy should both be lowered. When the concern is a
distributional aspect, then the given structure of energy taxes is
more reasonable. Furthermore, they concluded that given the
structure of demand for different energy products, equity could be
improved further by reducing the gasoline tax, increasing the
subsidy to kerosene, and imposing a tax on electricity.
A study from Rodrigo and Thorbecke (1997) is quite different
in modeling productivity gains in Indonesia. The idea is to use
externalities of promoting exports and encouraging faster
deployment of imported production technology. These externalities,
in turn, induce faster accumulation of human and social capital.
Since such accumulation cannot be quantified or measured
satisfactorily, then it can be “proxied” by tracked measures of
export growth, export orientation and the growth of imported
machinery. From the results of the simulation they concluded that
under maximum conditions, the share of TFPG (Total Factor of
Productivity Growth) in total GDP growth could rise to around 40%,
a ratio that would lift Indonesia parallel to the ranks of
productivity-driven countries such as Korea and Taiwan.
６４
Four major topics in the study of Indonesia using CGE during
the decade 2000-2009 are the international trade (Abimanyu: 2000,
Sugiyarto et al. 2003), environment (Resosudarmo: 2003), external
shock (Robilliard et al. 2001), and fiscal policy (Azis, 2006).
Abimanyu (2000) in his study tried to connect between trade
liberalization and the environmental aspect; in this case, the level of
pollution. In his framework, massive trade flows could result in a
flood of cheap but dirty products from other countries to the
domestic market. The condition also worsened by the relocation of
industries from countries which have relatively strict environmental
standards to those which are of relatively low standard. If the
condition occurs, Indonesia would be flooded with environment-
polluting industries. The study intended to simulate the effects of
trade liberalization of agricultural inputs and government subsidies
on the economic, social and environmental aspects. It is found that
trade liberalization policy, such as import tariff reduction, exerts a
beneficial effect on the industry and may strengthen the industrial
structure in the long term. Thus, the industry also benefits from
competition, as it become more efficient.
Additionally, from the environmental perspective, imported
agricultural inputs are relatively less harmful to the environment
６５
than domestically produced agricultural inputs. Furthermore, trade
liberalization stimulates the inflow of fewer dirty products to the
agricultural sector. Increasing subsidies for fertilizer should be
avoided because it seems to be more beneficial to the large
manufacturer and middle-income farmers. He concluded that
promoting trade openness along with providing targeted subsidies to
landless and poor farmers enables to the expansion of the economy
and achieves social and environmental objectives.
The answer to the question of whether globalization is
beneficial to Indonesia is attempted by Sugiyarto et al. (2003).
They argued that globalization policies are often examined without
consideration being given to their interactions with key sectors of
the economy, such as tourism. Using a CGE model for Indonesia
they simulate a globalization policy by tariff reductions, as a stand-
alone policy and in conjunction with tourism growth. The results of
their simulations show that tourism growth amplifies the positive
effects of globalization, which increases production and improves
welfare, while the adverse effects on government deficits and the
trade balance deficit are reduced.
Resosudarmo (2003) returned to the study of the
environmental impact on the economy or vice versa. He developed
６６
CGE models to analyze the impact of air pollution policies on
national economic performance and household incomes. The model
includes the impact of economic activities on air quality in urban
areas as well as the impact of urban air quality on the economy.
The links between air pollutants and the economy focus on the
relationships between urban production activities, urban air quality,
and human health problems in urban areas. His model assumes that
the government and the private sector invest in technology that can
reduce pollutants. He found that the implementation of policies to
improve urban air quality induce a higher GDP and increase the
income of poor households.
A study from Robilliard et al. (2001) is widely cited for its
contribution to the micro-simulation model for income generation
by household. The model quantifies the effects on poverty and
inequality of the financial crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997. The
micro-simulation models are based on a detailed representation of
the real income generation mechanism, capturing household
heterogeneity in terms of income sources, the area of residence,
demographic composition, an endowment in human capital, and
consumption preferences. Furthermore, it introduced alternative
social policy packages during the crisis such as food subsidies,
household transfers or public work programs.
６７
Azis (2006) showed that the drastic reduction in fuel subsidies
in 2005 was not unnecessary, especially considering the adverse
socio-economic climate, poverty and the political repercussions of
that unpopular policy. Instead, the reduction in fuel subsidies could
have been substituted by reducing subsidies for the banking sector,
providing that the money saves be spent on agricultural-related
infrastructures, it could have produced a favorable outcome
regarding income distribution and poverty alleviations without
deteriorating macroeconomic stability or injuring investors’
confidence.
Using 1995 data, Clements et al. (2007) conducted a simulation
of policies to reduce fuel subsidies in Indonesia in 2003. The study
analyzed the impact of higher petroleum prices on the aggregate
price level, real growth, and income distribution. A reduction in the
government subsidy raises petroleum prices and production costs
so that consumer demand, production, and income declines as
output prices increase and consumer purchasing power decreases.
By using a multi-sector CGE model, their analysis results showed
that the price level only slightly increases, output slightly decreases
and an urban household is a group that is significantly affected by
the subsidy reduction.
６８
Still discussing the Indonesian fuel price hike in 2005, Yusuf
and Resosudarmo (2008) examined that the fuel price reform could
have been progressive in reducing inequality if it had only increased
fuel prices for a motor vehicle. However, in practice, it tended to
increase income inequality, especially in urban areas where the
price of kerosene was also increased. Government mitigation in the
form of a uniform cash transfer to poor households neglecting its
heterogeneity tends to over-compensate the rural poor but under-
compensate the urban poor. It is due to the consumption pattern of
households in the urban area that are highly dependent on industrial
products and transportation, which is why the increase in fuel price
directly affects the price of both products. The result is a
significant reduction in the household welfare in an urban area
rather than a rural household.
In the period 2010 to 2016 several notable studies that use
CGE methods to Indonesia cases are Dartanto (2011) of the impact
of commodity prices; Resosudarmo et al. (2011) and Sakamoto
(2013) which uses a multiregional CGE; Dartanto (2013) which
discusses the fuel subsidy; Amir et al. (2013), and Yusuf and
Resosudarmo (2015) on income tax and carbon tax; and Kim et al.
(2016) which discusses infrastructure provision policy. A
６９
significant contribution of Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2015) is their
effort in disaggregating 200 classes of households (100 urban and
100 rural households grouped by expenditure per capita centiles),
which requires a large-scale household survey of data and
reconciliation of various data sources. The model also
disaggregates labor into 16 classifications, four types of skills
(agricultural, non-agricultural unskilled, clerical and services, and
professional workers), and distinguishes between urban and rural,
and formal and informal (unpaid) workers.
Dartanto (2013) when applying a CGE model found that
complete removal of fuel subsidies and the reallocation of 50% of
them to government spending, transfers, and other subsidies could
decrease poverty incidence by 0.28% in Indonesia. Irawan et al.
(2012) discussed the impact of infrastructure on the Indonesian
economy. They found that an improvement on any types of
infrastructure is expected to result in higher economic growth,
higher government revenue, higher factors' income, and lower the
poverty level. Moreover, they stated that if higher productivity is
used as an indicator for a better infrastructure, the improvement on
agriculture public work is economically preferable. If better
infrastructure means lower transport costs, then the improvement
７０
of transportation infrastructure on land gave a higher positive result
rather than water and air transportation. Lastly, if improvement of
infrastructure means an increase of capital stock, then investment
in the telecommunication sector is expected to result in higher
economic impacts rather than allocating more budgets to the
electricity sector.
Table 3 shows the development of CGE models in Indonesia.
The majority of the methods commonly used is the comparative
statics CGE. While the topic of research usually updated with the
problems that the Indonesian economy faced at the time. For
example, the paper of Gelb (1985) about the use of petroleum
windfall profit. Then about oil price shock and economic crisis
(Behrman et al., 1989; Robilliard et al., 2001), fuel subsidy (Azis,
2006; Clements et al., 2007; Yusuf and Resosudarmo 2008;
Dartanto, 2013), about the implication of regional autonomy
(Resosudarmo et al., 2011; Sakamoto, 2013), and the provision of
infrastructure (Irawan et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2016).
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Table 3 Development of the CGE Model in Indonesia
Author (year) Model type Policy issues
Gelb (1985) Dynamic
CGE




Static CGE International price shock
Resosudarmo and
Thorbecke (1996)
Static CGE Air pollution restriction
Yitzhaki and Lewis
(1996)
Static CGE Taxes reform




Static CGE Economic crisis
Sugiyarto et al.
(2003)










Static CGE Fuel subsidy
Yusuf and
Resosudarmo (2008)







subsidies, carbon tax, and
deforestation
Irawan et al. (2012) Static CGE Infrastructure provision
Dartanto (2013) Static CGE Fuel subsidy
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Chapter 4. Development of Financial CGE Model
4.1. Structure of Financial CGE Model
For the purposes of analysis, this research uses a Financial
CGE model. It is an integrated model of the real side of the
economy and financial asset choices to address the impacts of
shifting fuel subsidies to investment in transportation infrastructure.
This FCGE model is built on two major background studies that are
the financing model of Kim (1998) and the transportation network
model of Kim et al. (2004). To estimate the economic impact of the
transportation sector’s infrastructure investment on GDP and
inflation within a global network, Kim (1998) developed a recursive
dynamic CGE model. Using the model, he examined the alternatives
of financing source for the transportation sector, such as tax
revenues and foreign borrowings. The study found that the growth
effect of transportation investment would be maximized if the
private sector can freely use foreign capital. Additionally, the
impact of transportation investment on inflation could be minimized
if the project is funded from the tax revenues. As for estimating the
economic impacts of transport investments, such a calibration of the
economic effects of road infrastructure on GDP and household
７３
income, taking the reference from Kim et al. (2004) who measured
the dynamic economic effects of highway projects on the economic
growth and the regional disparity in Korea using the transport
network-multiregional CGE models. They defined that the change
in GDP is due to the indirect economic impacts associated with the
construction which was treated as benefits, while the construction
and operation costs of the highway are considered as costs.
In this paper, the Indonesian FCGE model consists of
interactions between the real-side and financial-side blocks.
Industrial activities are disaggregated into ten sectors: Agriculture
(AGRI), mining (MINE), other manufacturing (MANU), petroleum
and chemical (MOIL), utility (ELGW), construction (BLDG), trade,
hotel, and restaurant (TRAD), transportation and communication
(TRAN), banking and finance (FINA), and other service sectors
(OTHR). The portfolio choice for financial instruments (assets) is
disaggregated into real wealth, government bonds, and composite
financial instruments including currencies, credits, savings, time and
demand deposits, equity, insurance and pension funds. The
economic institutions are represented by four household classes
which are Rural Poor (RP), Rural High (RH), Urban Poor (UP) and
Urban High (UH), corporations (CO), the central bank (CB),
７４
government (GO), and the rest of the world (ROW).
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the real sector, trade
block, and financial sector. Firstly, export and import activities are
influenced by exchange rate and are the main component of the
current account in the balance of payment. In addition, export and
import activities also affect the domestic production activities. For
most of the countries, including Indonesia, import is one of input
component for production activities, while from the amount of
output generated by production activities some proportion is for
export.
For the sake of simplification, the non-financial firms
(corporations) and commercial banks are merged into one account,
corporation. In order to avoid misunderstanding, an intermediary
relationship between the central bank, banks and the non-financial
firm is shown in figure 5. Non-financial firms save money in banks
in the form of composite financial instruments, for instance, time
deposits (TD) or demand deposits (DD). Banks gave credit (CR) to
non-financial firms. Central banks control the circulation of money
by using central bank certificates (CBC) purchased by the
commercial bank to gain interest in return. Legally, the central bank
also requires commercial banks to withhold cash out of aggregate
７５
deposits as required reserves (RR).
Goods and services produced by each sector consist of
domestic commodities, import, and export, which are imperfectly
substituted. Domestically produced goods (XD) are made through
two stages of the production function, which are value-added and
composite intermediate inputs. At first stage, the value added (VA)
is determined by labor (L), capital (K) input and road capital stock
(RCS) and productivity by Cobb-Douglas production function. L is
determined according to profit maximization condition. K is defined
as the sum of lagged capital stock (LK) and current investment by
destination (INVD).
At the second stage, XD is produced through the composition of
VA and intermediate inputs by Leontief production technology. The
intermediate inputs are derived from input-output coefficients.
７６
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RCS: Road capital stock
LKi: Lagged capital
INVDi: Investment by destination
WAm: Average wage rate
wdistmi: wage distribution parameter
PVAi: Price of value-added
XDi: Domestically produced goods
INTERji: Intermediate inputs
７７
Figure 4 Methodological Framework
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Where
A: Assets; CFI: Composite financial instruments;
EQ: Equity; FDI: Foreign direct investment;
XR: Exchange rate; FXR: Foreign exchange reserves;
GB: Government bonds; GEX: Government expenditure;
L: Liabilities. GREV: Government revenue;
Figure 5 Bank Intermediaries
The RCS represent infrastructure availability that reflects the
importance of both the scale and proximity of economic activity and
is a proxy for the quality of transportation services and
development potential. The RCS is defined as a road length. The
value of road length is used for the estimation of the value-added
production function with two other factor inputs. Due to limitations
７９
on data availability of the capital stock by sector, the function is
estimated for the transportation sector only. The elasticity of the
road length with respect to the value added of the transportation
sector is estimated using the 1993-2013 data of industries and
road length and is presented below. Where TRAN is Transportation
& communication sector①
= −1.794 + 0.337 + 0.663 + 0.565 (12)
(-3.96) (9.62)        (18.97)        (5.54)
Adjusted R2 = 0.9864
SAM 2008 disaggregated labor into 16 job types, this model
disaggregated labor into 12 types of jobs (see Table 4 and 5).
Capital stock is assumed to be fixed in the short term. The demand
for labor by industry is derived from the producers' value-added
maximization of the first order conditions. Each producer requires a
set of factor inputs in which the marginal revenue of each factor
input is equal to its factor input price.
① For quasi production functions please see Oosterhaven and Elhorst (2003)
８０
Table 4 Type of Labor Definition





















L5 Administration, sales, services Rural Wage
L6 Administration, sales, services Urban Wage
L7 Administration, sales, services Rural Non-wage










































L1 11.009005 0.411171 1.423423 0.811990 0.035183 2.376172 0.368112 0.828537 0.037124 0.541700
L2 1.633814 0.170174 3.299853 1.392468 0.050375 1.892278 0.757354 1.214234 0.117381 1.255971
L3 25.518590 0.212788 1.656798 0.627003 0.003059 0.336481 0.294210 1.015402 0.004115 0.239074
L4 2.664101 0.037729 0.921475 0.151542 0.005373 0.247130 0.466416 1.091314 0.007332 0.335750
L5 0.216795 0.050708 0.357273 0.073273 0.011263 0.029106 0.973311 0.329610 0.159847 1.268586
L6 0.057492 0.087366 0.601260 0.454478 0.053780 0.219520 5.086405 1.154322 0.729631 3.456888
L7 0.064406 0.012944 0.086280 0.034317 0.002628 0.012287 6.155279 0.149258 0.015778 0.167956
L8 0.008576 0.002529 0.038405 0.004414 0.002089 0.055054 6.619108 0.154957 0.102937 0.348060
L9 0.062865 0.020956 0.065893 0.024712 0.005513 0.020372 0.065695 0.019056 0.019422 1.759913
L10 0.021750 0.042860 0.146716 0.170893 0.028010 0.133226 0.319363 0.186660 0.219087 3.379345
L11 0.067809 0.021063 0.064872 0.026097 0.000728 0.029852 0.056526 0.008869 0.004308 0.036040
L12 0.006503 0.000252 0.070194 0.045747 0.003113 0.087487 0.059965 0.027284 0.043023 0.310534
Total 41.331706 1.070540 8.732442 3.816934 0.201114 5.438965 21.221744 6.179503 1.459985 13.099817
８２
In international trade, Indonesia is assumed as a small and open
country that cannot affect prices on the international market. The
domestic market is assumed to be a price taker at the given world
price, that adopts the Armington approach. Composite goods (X)
include both domestically produced and demanded (XD) and
imported (IM). Consumers determine their IM consumption to
minimize the total cost at the given price and quantity. X can also be
sold in domestic (XD) or a foreign country (EX). The producer
allocates products to maximize their revenue at the given relative
price and quantity. Any positive difference between total exports
and total imports is regarded as foreign savings or the current
account deficit if it is negative.
∙ + ∙ (13)
s. t. = ∙ (δ ∙ + (1 − ) ∙ ) (14)
⇒ = (1 − ∙ ) (15)
∙ + ∙ (16)
s. t. = ∙ (γ ∙ + (1 − ) ∙ ) (17)
⇒ = (1 − ∙ ) (18)
８３
PMi: Price or imported goods PDi: Price of domestic goods
IMi: Import EXi: Export
Xi: Composite goods PEi: Price of exported goods
XDi: Domestically produced and demanded goods
The total demand for goods and services is a summation of
intermediate demands, total consumption expenditures for
households, government consumption expenditures, and investment.
Each institution gains production income as compensation for their
labor and capital inputs.
Households receive labor income (YLC) by type of labor is a
summation of average wage rate by type of labor in the sector (i)
and fixed labor income from rest of the world (YLCRW).
= ∙ , , + ∙ (19)
wdistm,i: Wage adjustment share by type of labor (m) by sector (i)
Capital income (YKC) is residual of value-added (VA) after
indirect taxes (itax) to government, and labor wage (WA) plus
sectoral subsidies to household, and fixed capital income from abroad
(YKCRW).
８４
= ( (1 − )− ( ∙ , ∙ , + )+ ∙
(20)
PVAi: Price of value-added by sector (i)
Therefore, the total income (Y) of each economic actors (e) is
labor income (YLC), capital income (YKC), summation of transfer
from other institution (TREA), net transfer to institutions from
abroad (TREARW), cumulative demand of financial assets (CDFA)
minus cumulative supply of financial assets (CSFA). Saving rates
(savep) are applied to total income (Y) after transfer among
economic actors (TREA).
= ∙ , + ∙ + ,+ +
+ , − , − ( ( , − , )) (21)
= (1 − , ) (22)
ylcpm,e: Allocation of labor income by type of labor by economic actor (e)
ykcpe: Allocation of capital income by economic actor (e)
DTAXe: Dummy variable for government
itaxi: Indirect tax rate by sector (i)
PA: rate of return
BCDFAb,e: Policy variable for cumulative demand of financial asset
(b) of economic actor (a)
BCSFAe,a: Policy variable for cumulative supply of financial asset
(a) of economic actor (e)
８５
Total consumption (PCT) is total income after transfer (TREA)
and savings (SAVE). For the government, subsidy and investment
must also be excluded from consumption.
= (1 − , ) − − − (23)
RINVDe: dummy variable for investment economic actor (e)
Bridging the gap between the real sector and the financial
sector is investment and savings balance. Assets and liabilities are
placements made by institutions on financial instruments in the
financial block. Meanwhile, fixed asset is an investment in the real
sector. Total savings (SAVINGS) is a summation of real asset
investment (DFARIV) by economic actor (e), summation of
government financial sources (RINVD), and summation of injection
(SHOCK) of financial asset (a) by economic actor (e), minus
summation of capital injection (KINVD) by sector (i)
= + + , − (24)
The macroeconomic closure rule is used to account for the way
in which equilibrium is achieved in the macroeconomic balances for
８６
the government, the rest of the world, and the capital account of
savings and investments (Iqbal & Siddiqui, 2001). Final demand for
productive investment (INVD) by sector (j) is total domestic
investment (INVEST) capital injection (KINVD) by sector (i)
, = + (25)
invdpj: Allocation of investment by destination sector (j)
In this research, the government saving (difference between
the government revenues and the government consumption
expenditures) is endogenous while all tax rates are exogenous. The
real exchange rate is flexible while the foreign savings are fixed in
the model.
The closure rule for the capital account is savings-driven, it
means that the investment expenditures increase or decrease so as
to meet the required savings. The flows into the capital account are
depreciation, savings, and financial liability. Depreciation is
considered as retained saving to compensate future investment.
Financial liability occurs when institutions borrow money from the
deposit, bonds or loans. Meanwhile, the outflow of capital is the
purchase of capital goods for investment or financial assets for
８７
wealth. Capital goods can be in the form of machinery, land,
buildings, and including products from the services sector.
Institutions are also buying financial assets to increase their wealth,
preparing the fund's shortage in the future. Capital goods purchased
by the institution are goods and services from production sectors or
imports. This original investment is distributed into production
activities as investment demand. Investments in each period enlarge
the capital stock recursively. After the development of
infrastructure, the road length is increased, meaning increased road
capital stock and consequently, the value added also increases.
The loanable fund markets such as money (deposits),
domestic bonds, equity and real capital are specified in the model.
Total wealth (WE) consists of real wealth and financial wealth. Real
wealth includes machinery and buildings; financial wealth is
classified into government bonds, and a composite of financial
instruments such as equity, deposits (money) and private bonds.
= + , + (26)
SFAe,a: Supply of financial assets (a) by economic actor (e)
SFARWe: Supply of financial assets from abroad by economic actor (e)
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The specification of the portfolio behavior of asset holders
(institutions) is based on Kim (1990) as shown in Figure 6. If the
return on investment increases compared to the interest rate, an
institution shift to buying more real assets for investment, such as
buildings and machinery. In the same way, if a bond's rate exceeds
the interest rate on the competing financial assets, institutions
would be willing to buy more bonds to increase their property
income from the bond's coupon.
Figure 6 Total Wealth Demand Structure
Each asset holder is required to make a decision regarding how
much they are willing to buy of two competing financial assets in
the portfolios in every successive stage. In the first stage, the total
wealth is divided into real wealth acquisition and the financial assets
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purchased in the ratio of g1:(1-g1). The ratio, g1, of real wealth to
total wealth is endogenously determined by the rate of return on the
investments and the average rate of return on the financial wealth.
The latter is again distributed to government bonds and composite
financial instruments in the ratio of g2:(1-g2).
= (27)
DFARIVe: Demand for real investment by economic actor (e)
DFAPRIVe: Share of real investment by economic actors (e)
= (1 − ) (28)
DFAGBe: Demand for financial assets (government bonds) by economic
actors (e)
DFAPGBe: Share of investment in financial instrument (government bonds)
by economic actors (e)
= (1 − )(1 − ) (29)
DFACFIe: Demand for financial assets (composite financial instruments)
by economic actors (e)
Financial decisions are also dependent on their net returns. In
order to reflect this asset demand relationship with its rate of return in
the model, the elasticity of demand parameter in respect to its relative
rate of return is derived from the regression model (see Table 6).
９０
(1 − ) = 0 1 +1 + (30)
dfap0gbe: Shift parameters of asset (government bonds) demand function
by economic actor (e)
PAGB: Price of government bonds
PACFI: Price of composite financial instruments
dfap2gbe: Elasticity parameters of asset (government bonds) demand
function by economic actor (e)
(1 − ) = 0 1 +1 + (31)
dfap0ive: Shift parameters of real asset demand function by economic
actor (e)
PARIV: Price of real investment
PAGBCFI: Rate of return of composite assets
dfap2rive: Elasticity parameters of real asset demand function by economic
actor (e)







1.230 1.777 1.777 4.623
Government
Bonds
3.663 6.573 7.138 6.949
The total supply of each financial asset is fixed, but the total
demand is the summation of an individual institution's demand that
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is derived from the maximization of revenue subject to imperfect
substitutability in the CET aggregation function shown in Figure 6.
Hence, the price of financial assets, namely the interest rate, varies
flexibly enough to generate a balance between the total demands
from all economic institutions and total supply.
The FCGE model consists of a two-step dynamic process
including a within-period model and a between-period model. An
adaptive and recursive pattern was selected, which was commonly
used in CGE applications for the dynamics of the model due to the
computation problems created by multi-sectoral classifications of
the institutions, the industrial sectors, and the financial assets. The
within-period model determines equilibrium quantities and prices
under objectives and constraints for each economic agent in the
context of a static model. The between-period model finds a
sequential equilibrium path for the within-period model over
multiple periods by updating the values of all exogenous variables
using the growth rate and adaptive expectation methods of
Devarajan and Robinson (2013). On the real side economy, the
current capital stock is expanded with new investment but also
reduced by a constant depreciation rate. The within-period model
is a square system of equations with 456 equations and 205
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exogenous variables including world market prices and labor supply.
The numeraire of the model is set as the consumer price index.
4.2. Calibration of Financial SAM
After the economic crisis in 1997/1998, one of the problems
that arose in Indonesian economy was the disconnection between
the financial sector and the real sector. The financial sector
indicators might have shown positive growth in terms of the stock
market and the money market activities, which was not a driving
factor for the real sector’s growth. In order to understand the
connection between the financial sector and the real sector, it is
necessary to develop a comprehensive and integrated data system
of those two markets.
Keuning and Ruuter (1988) defined the SAM as a numerical
representation of the economic cycle with emphasis on distributive
aspects. They identified how sectoral value, added accruals to
production factors and their institutional owners; how these
incomes, corrected for net current transfers are spent; and how
expenditure on commodities leads to sectoral production and value
added in the SAM framework.
９３
The SAM cycle also contained leakages, for instance, payments
to abroad or savings. In the late 1980s, capital finance has been
linked to savings that are the property of the FSAM. This linkage
connects between multi-industrial relationships in production to the
multi-sectoral distribution of income, consumption, investment in
fixed assets, and financial instruments in the economy as well as its
interaction with the rest of the world (Dakila et al., 2013).
The FSAM is a combination of the flow of funds (FOF) matrix
and the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) to macroeconomics that
provides details of the real financial transactions and flows between
economic agents (Emini and Fofack, 2004). Other definitions came
from Wong et al., 2009, referring to the FSAM as the flow of funds
between institutions in national economy activities, which construct
a complete SAM to be linked with a detailed capital account in the
matrices. In simple, the FSAM can be regarded as the SAM with a
detailed capital account of each economic agent regarding physical
and financial investments, which can be used as an analytical tool to
account for the transmission between real and financial sectors and
to measure the impact between both sectors.
The author calibrated FSAM 2008 using SAM 2008 from
Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and Bank Indonesia (BI/central bank).
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Through the integration of the financial sector FOF matrix into
Indonesia SAM, the FSAM was able to trace out financial
transmission channels, which eventually affected monetary policy
formulation. There are nine components in Indonesia FSAM; namely
Factor of Productions, Institutions, Production Sector, Trading and
Transportation Margin, Commodities, Capital, Indirect Taxes and
Subsidies, Financial Instruments, and Foreign sector. In detail, the
Indonesian FSAM disaggregates to 79 dimensions of components.
The main data sources used in constructing FSAM are Input Output
(IO) data, Social Accounting Matrix and flow of funds data that are
supported by the results of special surveys, such as the Special
Survey of Input and Output, Special Survey of Household Savings
and Investment and Special Survey of Private Company.
In concept, the SAM captures all the economic activities that
run in a country, but it is limited in grasping financial sector
activities. The links between the real sector and the financial sector
are described in the capital account that records information about
gross savings by the institutions (households, government, and
enterprise). The gross saving is the excess of revenue over
expenditure, which is then used to finance physical investment. In
practice, the gross saving by the economic agent is not only used to
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finance physical investments but also used to finance investments in
non-physical or investment portfolios, such as for the purchase of
securities, deposits, foreign exchange, and others. Alternatively, the
sources of funds for real and financial investments are not
exclusively coming from gross savings, but can also be derived
from other sources of funding, such as loans and bonds issuance, or
withdrawal from another source. Such interactions produce the
change of assets and liabilities in the financial balance of economic
actors. The links between gross savings and real investment as well
as between the source and the use of financial instruments are
included in the FSAM, which can provide a more detailed framework
in which to understand the movement of the financial sector in
relation to the real sector activities or vice versa. The FSAM is
expected to examine various transmission paths traversed by
economic actors, and to monitor the impact of various monetary
policies on real sector performance.
In calibrating the FSAM of Indonesia for this dissertation, the
capital account in the SAM needs to be extended to be able to
provide information on savings and investment, as well as the
movement of the assets and liabilities of the economic actors.
Calibration is done by inserting a flows of funds matrix into the
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SAM’s capital account. Institutions in the Indonesian flow of funds
matrix are divided into four groups: the Central Bank, Commercial
Banks, Other Domestic Institutions, Government, and Foreign. We
disaggregate Other Domestic Institutions into six agents which are
Non-bank Financial Institutions, Non-financial Enterprises and four
Households (Rural Poor, Rural High, Urban Poor, and Urban High).
Disaggregation of the Other Domestic Institutions was done by
replicating the share of six respective agents in the FSAM 2005. In
order to simplify the analysis, an aggregation is required to some of
the accounts. The aggregation of FSAM 2008 accounts is as follows:
1. Commercial Banks, Non-Bank Financial Institutions, and Non-
Financial Enterprise merge into “Corporation” account;
2. Commodities and Activities merged into “Industries” by
sector accounts;
3. There are only two financial instruments, which are
“Government Bonds” and “Composite Financial Instrument.”
The Composite Financial Instrument is an aggregation of 16
financial instruments.
A block of cells of physical investment by sector of industry
was added to the matrix, replicating the pattern of investment by
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destination matrix from Kim et al., (2016). The calibrated
Indonesian FSAM 2008, is presented in the appendix.
Table 5 shows the aggregated Indonesian FSAM 2008. The
rows of the FSAM account are for the income (receipts), and the
columns accounts are for the use (expenditures) by economic
agents. Its upper left corner (accounts 1 to 8) concerns real
variables, while its lower left and right corner (accounts 9-11)
concerns the financial variables and flows between agents. Account
12 is concerned with the rest of the world, where the real sectors
account such as export, import, income, and transfers from and to
foreign countries is located, including financial assets and liabilities
held by foreign countries. The linkages between the real and
financial aspects of the economy are provided by institution’s
savings in row 10 of the FSAM. The savings are presented in the
form of flows in the capital accounts and changes in the assets and
liabilities accounts of economic agents. Savings may be viewed as
equivalent to changes in net worth, where net worth includes both
physical capital and net financial assets.
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Table 7 Financial Social Accounting Matrix of Indonesia 2008②
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L 1 2692.613 -3.712 2688.901
K 2 2464.314 -84.569 2379.745
Institutions
CB 3 33.117 0.674 8.268 0.009 -10.331 31.737
CO 4 1558.080 12.59 82.006 81.424 35.152 -25.819 1743.433
GO 5 0.497 649.554 181.676 85.071 344.937 -26.408 1235.327
HH 6 2688.901 788.548 0.026 43.055 199.032 43.357 48.031 3810.950
Industry 7 294.563 3318.089 6389.106 240.891 1530.237 1465.839 13238.725
Subsidy 8 240.891 240.891
Investments 9 1530.237 1530.237
Capital account 10 18.624 968.144 229.473 329.272 583.120 37.343 2165.976
Financial instrument 11 635.739 -52.619 583.120
Rest of the World 12 1347.755 1347.755
Total 13 2688.901 2379.745 31.737 1743.433 1235.327 3810.950 13238.725 240.891 1530.237 2165.976 583.120 1347.755
② L: Labor; K: Capital; CB: Central Bank; CO: Company; GO: Government; HH: Household;
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Chapter 5. Policy Simulations
5.1. Shifting Fuel Subsidy Policy
An essential policy pursued by the government in the 2015
budget revision was the diversion of unproductive to productive
spending to accelerate the achievement of objectives and
development priorities. The policy is pursued through an efficiency
in subsidy expenditure by abolished subsidies for regular fuel, fixed
subsidy for diesel oil, but still providing subsidies for kerosene. The
policy aims to improve government capability to fund the programs
or activities that are more productive; it is also intended to minimize
the fiscal vulnerability from the impact of external factors such as
fluctuations international crude oil prices and the exchange rate.
Government diverts subsidy funds amounting to Rp186 trillion
(US$13.92 billion) to various productive programs, in outline
allocated to:
1. Additional social protection fund amounting to Rp14.3 trillion
(US$1070.20 million);
2. Additional health protection fund of Rp422 billion (US$31.58
million) or equal to additional 1.8 million people beneficiaries.
Additional amenities, facilities, and infrastructure for the
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national referral hospital Rp2.2 trillion (US$164.65 million);
3. The Village Fund of Rp11.7 trillion (US$875.62 million);
4. The development of country border fleet, marine logistics and
information systems Rp3.3 trillion (US$246.97 million);
5. The education sector amounted to Rp6.4 trillion (US$478.97
million), among others, to give education vouchers to an
additional 10 million students. Therefore the total education
voucher recipients become 19.2 million students;
6. The agricultural sector amounted to Rp16.9 trillion
(US$1264.78 million), among others, to increase food
production through irrigation development, provision of tools
and agricultural machinery, fertilizer, and seeds;
7. The housing sector and public works. For irrigation, dams, and
flood control amounted to Rp8.4 trillion (US$628.65 million).
The development of drinking water, environmental sanitation,
housing development amounted to Rp9.1 trillion (US$681.04
million). The construction of road infrastructure and road on
the country borders amounted to Rp10.0 trillion (US$748.39
million). The land acquisition for highway amounted to Rp5.75
trillion (US$430.32 million);
8. The transportation sector amounted to Rp11.9 trillion
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(US$890.59 million) for the construction of various types of
ships, seaport facilities, and information systems;
9. The increase in regional transfer in the form of special
allocation funds, for irrigation infrastructure, amounted to
Rp9.3 trillion (US$696.00 million), for agriculture amounted to
Rp4.0 trillion (US$299.36 million), for roads construction
amounted to Rp5.0 trillion (US$374.20), and for the
improvement of health referral services amounted to Rp1.4
trillion (US$104.77 million).
5.2. Policy Simulation of Subsidies and Infrastructure
The crude oil price hike provided the government with
additional revenues with which to bear the fuel subsidy that has
been enjoyed by the middle and upper-classes (Dartanto, 2013).
However, the reduction of the fuel subsidy results in an increase in
the fuel price, in turn, the price of other goods also increases. In
2014, fuel subsidies reached Rp240.0 trillion (US$20.22 billion), or
20.3 percent of central government spending, while government
capital expenditures were only Rp177.9 trillion (US$ 14.12 billion)
or 14.2 percent of central government spending (see Figure 7).
Evidently, the government allocated more in non-productive
１０２
expenditure in the form of fuel subsidies. Then, fuel subsidies as a
percentage of central government expenditure dropped to 5.1
percent in 2015, as it partially transferred to capital expenditures,
where the percentage rose to 18.0 percent of central government
spending or Rp189.7 trillion (US$15.96 billion). Economic growth
and inflation in 2014 reached 5.02 and 8.36 percent, respectively.
In 2015, the economic growth rate was decelerated to 4.79% and
the inflation rate also decreased to 3.35 percent.































































Recall the government fiscal policy previously mentioned to
divert the fuel subsidy into a variety of programs, such as the
construction of road infrastructure and road on country borders
amounted to Rp10 trillion (US$0.748 billion) and the regional
transfer in the form of special allocation funds for roads
construction amounted to Rp5 trillion (US$0.374 billion). Thus the
central government reallocated funds amounted to Rp15 trillion
(US$1.123 billion) fuel subsidies for the construction of road
infrastructure.
In order to get an appropriate estimation on how much
additional road can be built with the diverted subsidy fund; in the
model, the nominal value of 2015 had to be converted into constant
prices 2008 using the GDP deflator. The GDP deflator index for
2008 and 2015 respectively was 85.31 and 135.36. Thus the 2008
constant value of Rp15 trillion was Rp9.45 trillion (US$0.975 billion
in 2008 exchange rate). Thus the length of additional road that can
be constructed with the diverted fuel subsidy money is equal to
1465.38 kilometers.
There are six simulations to determine the impact of fuel
subsidy and transportation investment to GDP and income
distribution in Indonesia, whether it is financed by a tax, budget
reallocation, government bonds or bank loan, as follows.
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1. Option 1: To cut fuel subsidy by Rp15 trillion (US$1122.59
million) in period 1;
2. Option 2: To cut fuel subsidy by Rp15 trillion and to use it for
road investment in period 1, assume that in period 2 road length
is expanded by 1465.38 kilometers and fully functional;
3. Option 3: To cut fuel subsidy by Rp15 trillion, and then
government also to increase tax by Rp15 trillion and to use it
for road investment in period 1, assume that in period 2 road
length is expanded by 1465.38 kilometers and fully functional;
4. Option 4: To cut fuel subsidy by Rp15 trillion, and then
government also to issue government bonds by Rp15 trillion
and to use it for road investment in period 1, assume that in
period 2 road length is expanded by 1465.38 kilometers and
fully functional;
5. Option 5: to increase tax by Rp15 trillion and to use it for road
investment in period 1, assume that in period 2 road length is
expanded by 1465.38 kilometers and fully functional;
6. Option 6: to borrow money from the bank by Rp15 trillion and
to use it for road investment in period 1, assume that in period
2 road length is expanded by 1465.38 kilometers and fully
functional.
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Table 8 is a summary of policy options to reduce fuel subsidy
and road investment with various financing sources. Minus sign (-)
indicates fuel subsidy reduction, while positive sign (+) indicates an
injection of the corresponding columns.













Option 2 (-) (+)
Option 3 (-) (+) (+)
Option 4 (-) (+) (+)
Option 5 (+) (+)
Option 6 (+) (+)
Table 9 presents the simulation results of the impact on GDP.
The unpopular policy to cut fuel subsidy is exercised in option 1.
The policy to reduce fuel subsidy by Rp15 trillion ((US$1122.59
million), produces the lowest average GDP compared to other
options, lower than the baseline by –0.0037%. When it firstly
introduced in period 1, GDP is lower by 0.0224%, but then the
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effect fades away over the time. Therefore, on average, the value is
quite small. The fuel subsidy reduction allows the economy to
adjust for a lesser fuel consumption. Sectors of industry reduce
their dependence on subsidized fuel and make the switch to another
kind of energy. Similarly, the end consumer, such as households,
rationalizes their consumption of subsidized fuel and replaces it with
another energy. Industry and household behaviors are changing due
to the reduced fuel subsidy with the level of economic activity
eventually returning to the baseline with new consumption patterns.
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Table 9 Impacts on GDP Growth (in percentage)
Baserun= 0
Options Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8
Option 1 -0.0224 -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0039 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0023
Option 2 -0.0224 0.0157 0.0165 0.0173 0.0179 0.0184 0.0189 0.0193
Option 3 -0.0103 0.0282 0.0208 0.0212 0.0216 0.0219 0.0222 0.0224
Option 4 -0.0237 0.0133 0.0149 0.0162 0.0174 0.0183 0.0192 0.0200
Option 5 0.0119 0.0335 0.0254 0.0252 0.0250 0.0249 0.0248 0.0247
Option 6 -0.0013 0.0187 0.0195 0.0202 0.0208 0.0214 0.0219 0.0224
Options Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Average
Option 1 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.00373
Option 2 0.0197 0.0201 0.0204 0.0207 0.0210 0.0212 0.0214 0.01641
Option 3 0.0226 0.0229 0.0231 0.0232 0.0234 0.0236 0.0237 0.02069
Option 4 0.0208 0.0215 0.0221 0.0228 0.0234 0.0239 0.0245 0.01698
Option 5 0.0246 0.0246 0.0245 0.0244 0.0243 0.0242 0.0240 0.02441
Option 6 0.0228 0.0232 0.0236 0.0239 0.0242 0.0245 0.0248 0.02070
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Except for the OTHR sector, all the sectors are affected by the
negative impact of subsidy cuts (see Table 10). The big three of
the sectors most affected by subsidy cut are the utility (ELGW)
sector, mining (MINE) sector, and transport and communications
(TRAN) sector. This three sector effect directly related to
subsidized fuel. The mining sector is associated with crude oil
production, the transport sector is one of the largest consumers of
fuel subsidies, while the utility sector also has to provide subsidized
electricity with subsidized diesel. The OTHR sector survived the
negative impact of subsidy cut because this policy creates a broader
fiscal space for the government budget. Government spending is
mainly disbursed in this very sector. The decline in the value-
added to other industries sector shows that the subsidized fuel are
complementary goods for their industry. Regarding household
income, all household income decreased compared to the baseline
(see Table 11). The most severe decline is the poor households in
urban areas, because they require the use of kerosene for daily
cooking activities, as previously revealed by Yusuf and
Resosudarmo (2008) that kerosene subsidies could progressively
have an effect in reduction of poverty in urban areas.
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Table 10 Impact on Value Added (average)
Baserun= 0
Sectors Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6
Agriculture -0.0040 0.0007 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0051 0.0028
Mining -0.0063 -0.0086 -0.0079 -0.0142 -0.0016 -0.0079
Other Manufacturing -0.0055 -0.0050 -0.0040 -0.0084 0.0016 -0.0029
Utility -0.0069 0.0097 0.0091 0.0021 0.0161 0.0091
Building -0.0025 -0.0006 0.0208 0.0205 0.0233 0.0229
Trade, Hotel & Restaurant -0.0046 0.0000 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0064 0.0035
Transport & Communication -0.0056 0.2223 0.2650 0.2605 0.2705 0.2661
Finance -0.0054 -0.0008 0.0010 -0.0025 0.0064 0.0029
Other Services 0.0091 0.0249 0.0097 0.0082 0.0005 -0.0009
Petroleum & Chem. -0.0034 0.0086 0.0136 0.0115 0.0170 0.0149
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Table 11 Impact on Household Income (average)
Baserun= 0
Options Rural Poor Rural High Urban Poor Urban High
Option 1 -0.0192 -0.0119 -0.0235 -0.0099
Option 2 -0.0005 0.0066 -0.0033 0.0134
Option 3 0.0106 0.0125 0.0054 0.0158
Option 4 0.0003 0.0094 -0.0099 0.0102
Option 5 0.0298 0.0244 0.0290 0.0258
Option 6 0.0195 0.0213 0.0136 0.0201
In terms of labor income, the most affected labor are those with
low income who do not have a steady source of income (see Table
12). Low-income groups are labor L1, L2, L3, and L4, working in
the agricultural field or manual labor. Labor who do not have a
steady income (non-wage) that is labor L7, L8, and L11. Labor L7
and L8 are administration personnel, sales, and services that do not
have a regular income and live in rural or urban areas. While labor
L11 are professionals living in rural areas, who do not have a
steady income. They experienced a drop in real income due to
rising fuel prices. Labor who have a regular income can anticipate
fuel price hike by rationing the consumption of other goods and
services. While for those who do not have a regular income it is
certainly not easy to do rationing before they have the assurance of
income.
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Table 12 Impact on Labor Wage (average)
Baserun= 0
Labor Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 Option 6
L1 -0.0100 0.0079 0.0190 0.0132 0.0290 0.0232
L2 -0.0028 0.0122 0.0205 0.0181 0.0233 0.0208
L3 -0.0121 0.0060 0.0127 0.0061 0.0249 0.0182
L4 -0.0069 -0.0053 -0.0039 -0.0085 0.0030 -0.0016
L5 0.0066 0.0336 0.0230 0.0208 0.0165 0.0143
L6 0.0046 0.0323 0.0239 0.0208 0.0193 0.0162
L7 -0.0042 0.0291 0.0278 0.0213 0.0319 0.0255
L8 -0.0034 0.0308 0.0291 0.0228 0.0325 0.0262
L9 0.0225 0.0721 0.0486 0.0505 0.0260 0.0279
L10 0.0187 0.0628 0.0435 0.0445 0.0249 0.0258
L11 -0.0033 0.0218 0.0277 0.0240 0.0310 0.0273
L12 0.0102 0.0476 0.0425 0.0420 0.0324 0.0318
The policy to divert fuel subsidy into infrastructure provision is
reflected in option 2. The policy simulation results show that GDP
at period 1 drops by 0.0224% from the baseline. However, after the
road construction is completed at the end of period 1, GDP jumps to
0.0157% and continue to grow gradually in the subsequent year, on
average GDP grows by 0.0164%. It can be interpreted as follows; at
the time when the subsidy is reduced, the economic institutions
rationalize their consumption of subsidized fuel and other goods that
１１２
are closely associated with fuel. At period 2, expanded road capital
stock helps to increase production activity, and at this time with
altered consumption patterns, which is less dependent on subsidized
fuel. As a result, higher value added was gained.
The transportation and communication (TRAN) sector gave the
highest increase in value added, while the mining sector is the most
hit by this policy. The TRAN sector is the sector that directly gains
additional road stock. Therefore its value added gave the highest
increase in option 1. Related to household income, the groups of a
poor household in urban and rural areas experience a negative
impact on the transfer of the fuel subsidy into infrastructure
development fund. This indicates that the poor household groups
are in relatively more need for subsidized fuel that the rich group.
Additionally, this poor household group did not enjoy the increasing
value added from the new road capital stock. This is because the
sectors in which they usually work, such as BLDG sectors
experience a lessened value added as a result of diverting fuel
subsidy policy. It was confirmed by a reduction in labor wage of
labor L4 (low-skilled, urban, non-wage) which are usually working
in the BLDG sector. The labor groups that most benefit from the
option 1 is labor L9, those who earn fixed salaries and live in the
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rural area, for example, the civil servants. This group of labor does
not need much of a fuel subsidy since they are only traveling a
short distance and experience fewer traffic jams.
Option 3 simulates that government insists on cutting subsidies
to loosen fiscal space but at the same time urges to build
infrastructure which is financed by additional tax revenue. The
simulation results showed that on average GDP grows by 0.0207%.
All sectors of industry gain an increase in value added, except the
mining (MINE) sector and other manufacturing (MANU). All groups
experienced an increase in income, where the increase in the rich
group is larger than in the poor households. Only labor L4
experience a decreasing income.
Option 4 illustrates the condition when the government removes
fuel subsidy but at the same time increases the amount of debt by
issuing government bonds to finance infrastructure provision. The
simulation results showed that on average GDP increased slightly
above the result of option 2. Five out of ten sectors, including
agriculture, mining, other manufacturing, hotel trade and restaurant,
and finance has decreased in value added. The mining sector is the
sector most affected by the negative impact of this policy option; it
is related to the elimination of fuel subsidies. The finance sector is
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also exposed to a negative impact due to the policy options, in
relation to a crowding out effect. The sector showing the most
growth in policy option 4 is the transport and communications
sector. Only the urban poor households which experience an income
decrease from this policy option and this is associated with the
increase in the price of subsidized fuel, kerosene to be precise.
This is confirmed by a decline in labor L4 income, the group that
does not have a fixed income.
Option 5 illustrates the use of tax money for productive
government spending, for example by building infrastructure. This
policy resulted in the largest average GDP. Almost all sectors
experienced an increase in value-added sectors except the mining
sector (see Table 8). The sector which highest increase in value-
added in option 5 are transport and communications (TRAN) sector,
these are the consequences because road construction investment
is injected into this sector.
With regard to the income of households, all households
experience an income increase as a result of option 5 (see Table
11). The highest income increases happen to the poor households in
rural and urban areas, because when the government levy additional
tax to build infrastructure, poor households do not bear a great tax
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burden as wealthy households.  All groups experienced an increase
in labor income in option 5. The highest income increase occurrence
is for the labor group L8, which consists of labor in administrative,
sales and service which do not have a regular income. Therefore
they might be excused from the impact of tax increase.
Option 6 illustrates what happens the government wants to
borrow money from financial markets through a banking system.
Option 6 and 4 involving the use of a financial instrument, which is
not possible to perform when using a conventional real-side CGE.
On average during the 15 years of simulation GDP grows by
0.0207%, higher than the result of option 4. Only mining, other
manufacturing, and the other services sector experience a decrease
in value added. Apparently, the transport and communication sector,
and construction sector gives the highest value-added increase.
The finance sector is surviving from negative impact, whether this
is an indication of a no crowding out effect its needs further
examination.
In planning a public policy, besides the impact on economy and
income distribution, another aspect that is also being questioned is
the public welfare. In this case, the technique used is to compare
the state of existing equilibrium where there are no changes to
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policies with the counterfactual equilibrium state modified by the
policy options. The general procedure is to construct numerical
welfare measures of gain and loss.
Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations are widely
used measures of utility associated with the equilibrium comparison.
The compensating variation (CV) took a new benchmark of
equilibrium income and prices and then asked how much income that
must be taken or added to the household in order to return to the
previous utility level before the policy change. While the equivalent
variation (EV) using a benchmark of income and prices of old
equilibrium, and then calculating how much changes is necessary to
reach the new equilibrium level of utility. The impact to the whole
economy, the welfare gain and loss of the subsidy cut, road
investment and its funding sources is the sum of the CVs or EVs of
every household. By using the utility and income of households, CV
and EV can be calculated easily by using the following formula
(Shoven and Whalley, 1984).
= ( − ) (24)
= ( − ) (25)
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Where UN, UO, IN and IO denote the new levels of utility, old level of
utility, new levels of income and old level of income, respectively.
Table 13 Welfare Measures of the Policy Impact (average)
Welfare
Measures




Rural Poor -0.01770 0.00754 0.02000 0.01129 0.03769 0.02899
Rural High -0.17407 0.30830 0.44638 0.41936 0.62049 0.59321
Urban Poor -0.01256 0.00449 0.01071 0.00214 0.02354 0.01464
Urban High -0.31179 0.71371 0.87282 0.67576 1.18480 0.98732











Rural Poor -0.01770 0.00754 0.02000 0.01129 0.03769 0.02899
Rural High -0.17404 0.30834 0.44641 0.41942 0.62052 0.59324
Urban Poor -0.01256 0.00449 0.01071 0.00214 0.02354 0.01464
Urban High -0.31176 0.71377 0.87288 0.67584 1.18485 0.98737







-0.01138 0.01254 0.01853 0.01364 0.02992 0.02502
Table 11 presents the calculation results of Hicksian
compensating and equivalent variations, and there are no significant
differences between the CV and EV calculation results. Option 1,
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cutting fuel subsidies led to a loss in total welfare amounting to
0.011% of total household income. The wealthy households in urban
areas experienced the biggest welfare loss, followed by the rural
rich households. This is a confirmation that they are benefited from
fuel subsidy the most. Therefore when fuel subsidy is reduced, they
become the most disadvantaged groups experiencing a decrease in
welfare. Other policy options result in increasing welfare for all
household groups.
The highest increase in welfare occurs when governments
implement policy option 5 which is to increase tax revenue and then
use it for investment to build roads. The total household welfare
increased by 1.87 units or 0.030% of total household income, this
welfare increase is outpacing the economic growth which is only
0.024%.
In options 6 welfare increase by 0.004 percentage point higher
than the increase in output. While in option 2, 3 and 4, GDP increase
is higher than welfare improvement. It also happens to option 1
where the reduction of fuel subsidy which is not accompanied by
mitigation or other counter-policy resulted in a decrease in welfare
deeper than the decline in output. It is a confirmation of Widodo et
al. (2012) findings that fuel prices are embedded in households and
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firms' optimization problem. In regard to a lower increase in welfare
than the increase in output will be outlined in the final chapter of
this paper as the topic of further research.
The policy simulation results on the income distribution are
shown in Figure 8. When the government cut fuel subsidy without
compensation policies, such as in option 1, the result is an
improvement of income distribution, 0.027% lower than the baseline,
the best compared to the other simulation results. This occurs
because the rich households experienced a deeper decrease in real
income than the poor households resulting in more equitable income
distribution (This is less visible in Table 11 because it was the
value of 15-year average change of household income). Theil index
comparison between the baseline and option 1 is presented in Table
14, which shows that income distribution has improved from period
1 to period 15.
Option 2, the policy to divert fuel subsidy into government
capital expenditure for the construction of roads also came up with
a worse income distribution, Theil index increase by 0.032%
compared to the baseline. Option 2, generated economic growth but
on the other hand, worsens income distribution. This can be
understood as follows, that the construction of the road and its
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function as the capital stock causes the rich household to benefit
the most from additional value added created by additional road
capital stock, although previously their real income had dropped due
to subsidy cuts.
Figure 8 Impacts on Income Distribution (unit: Theil index)
In option 3, the government cut the fuel subsidy then collected
additional taxes to invest in roads. The result is an increase in
every household income (see Table 11). However, the increase in
the rich household income is higher than the poor household income,
at the end, the result is deterioration in the income distribution,












Option 4 illustrates the circumstances in which the government
deems it is necessary to cut subsidies while the investment needs
of road construction were taken from financial markets by issuing
government bonds. The policy options generate an income
distribution that is worse by 0.029% than the baseline because all
household groups experienced an increase in income except for the
urban poor households. However, the distribution of income of
policy option 4 is better than option 2. It is necessary to compare
these two options since both reduce subsidies and build road
infrastructure; the difference is option 4 used borrowed funds from
the public through the issuance of government bonds.
Table 14 Theil Index of Baserun and Option 1
Scenario Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Baserun 0.25187 0.25180 0.25162 0.25136 0.25118
Option 1 0.25127 0.25174 0.25157 0.25132 0.25114
Scenario Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10
Baserun 0.25110 0.25107 0.25106 0.25107 0.25109
Option 1 0.25106 0.25104 0.25103 0.25104 0.25107
Scenario Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15
Baserun 0.25113 0.25118 0.25124 0.25132 0.25141
Option 1 0.25110 0.25115 0.25122 0.25130 0.25140
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Option 5, which is to build road infrastructure using additional
tax while maintaining the fuel subsidy provides the worst income
distribution, Theil index increased by 0.069% compared to the
baseline. It is a structural problem that can be explained as follows.
At one side, the rich household group continues to enjoy additional
real income by consuming subsidized fuel. At the other side, the
investment in road infrastructure means an addition to capital stock.
In the production process, more capital stocks mean more value
added. The value added is distributed to those who have more
factors of production. The wealthy household groups, rural high and
urban high have more possession of the production factor than the
poor households, rural poor and urban poor. Thus road investment
is more favorable in terms of income distribution to wealthy
households.
In the options 6 the government is using funds from the banking
system to create road provision, this is just like the government
assign SOE in the construction sector to build roads using loan
funds from commercial banks. Aside from generating the second
largest increase in GDP, this policy option also produces the second
worst income distribution where inequality raised by 0.056% above
the baseline, only defeated by option 5.
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Based on the simulation results, there is no superior policy
option for both GDP and income distribution. In order to find the
best policy option for a combination of GDP growth and income
distribution, a quadrant matrix is used. The value of simulation
results from table 7 and figure 8 are standardized and then plotted
on a quadrant diagram (see Figure 9). The midpoint (0, 0) is the
average of each options results. On the upright axis is the scale of
GDP growth, where the area in quadrants I and II are favorable
because they indicate an increase in GDP. While the income
distribution represented by the Theil index is set on the horizontal
axis, where the quadrants II and III are a favorable area for
improving the distribution of income since the Theil index is
decreased.
Option 1, the subsidy cut, is the most extreme point where the
best improvement of income distribution is accompanied by the
worst decline in GDP. The next extreme point is option 5, to
increase tax revenues in order to finance investment in road
infrastructure, generates the highest GDP increase that
accompanies the worst income distribution compared to the baseline.
Option 3 and option 6 resulted in almost the same GDP growth, but
the distribution of income from option 3 is better than the option 6.
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Figure 9 Policy Options Result
The impact of option 2 and option 4 are relatively more
favorable than the other policy options, since GDP growth and
income distribution improvements are better than average. Also in
relative terms, option 4 is better than option 2, since it produces a
higher GDP growth and better income distribution than average.
The problem is, option 4 is using government bonds as a source of
financing for road infrastructure investment, which means it places



















which is the less favorable option for the Finance Minister as Chief
Financial Officer (CFO).
If the government concern is only to increase GDP, then the
best policy option is to build infrastructure using money from tax.
Meanwhile, when the government's concern is to improve income
distribution, then the best policy is to cut fuel subsidy. When the
fuel subsidy is cut, and infrastructure development must be applied
simultaneously, then the best policy option for the sake of
increasing GDP is to combine it with raising tax revenues. However,
if the government concern is income distribution, then the best
policy is to combine the subsidy cut and the development of
infrastructure with the issuance of government bonds, even though
the income distribution is worse than the baseline, however, the
Theil index is lower than average, but unfortunately, this policy
option narrows fiscal space since the government debt is increasing.
Policy implication of the result is, that the infrastructure
development policies coupled with a policy of cutting subsidy alone
are not enough to improve the distribution of income, it should be
combined with other fiscal policy such as social assistance in the
form of health insurance, scholarship, food aid, business loan or job
creation, intended for the poor household group.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
The government of Indonesia executed a dramatic policy to
shift fuel subsidies to various pro-people programs including
transportation construction projects. The purpose of this paper is to
analyze whether government policy to reallocate fuel subsidy into
infrastructure development is favorable for Indonesian economy in
terms of GDP and income distribution. The financial CGE model is
employed to simulate the impact of fiscal policy regarding fuel
subsidy and road investment, calibrating a 2008 Financial Social
Accounting Matrix of Indonesia. Other policy options have also been
simulated to identify a better policy for economic growth and
income inequality.
This model is the first Financial CGE model of Indonesia to use
Financial SAM 2008 as its database. It is also the first paper using
the Financial CGE models in analyzing the impact of fiscal policy
related to fuel subsidies in Indonesia. Finally, the model in this
research is a dynamic Financial CGE model with an attribute of a
multi-sector, multi-household and multi economic-actor, multi-
labor and multi-assets.
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It is found that with regard to GDP growth the policy of using
additional tax money to build roads infrastructure generates the
highest GDP and welfare increase. Regarding the distribution of
income, the policy to reduce fuel subsidies is the best policy
measure since the fuel subsidy policy has been mistargeted to
wealthy households. Other policies did not produce a better income
distribution compared to the baseline condition. If the government
insists on making fiscal space for supporting other productive
activities, then the shifting of fuel subsidy into infrastructure
provision is applicable.
This research was conducted for Indonesian case studies.
Generalizations that can be drawn from this paper relates to fiscal
policy on subsidies wide or energy subsidies, in particular,
government capital expenditure, infrastructure development, the
economic impact of road procurement. All of these subject areas
would certainly have things in common with other countries who
have problems which are similar to those faced by Indonesia, for
instance on how the government is to deal with fiscal pressure on
unproductive spending or the impact on new debt issuance or the
impacts of infrastructure development in the long term, or which
households and labor are affected by the government's certain fiscal
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policy. This paper assumes that all roads have the same impact on
the value-added creation. Most of the roads build by the
reallocating fund are in the country borders or remote areas that
might have a different impact if the road if were built in high-
density population area.
As mentioned in the previous section, that in terms of fuel
subsidy reduction and its counter-policy by transferring the funds
into transportation infrastructure investment give result welfare
increase less than output increase. It is interesting to be explored
those result as a further research topic for the following reasons.
First, whether the mitigation of fuel subsidy reduction by building
road infrastructure requires a larger project value in terms of
rupiah in order to obtain a higher increase in household welfare than
the increase in output. Second, to find alternatives infrastructure
projects rather than transportation infrastructure which bring higher
welfare increase than the increase in GDP. To satisfy research
purpose, the FCGE model used in this paper can be reuse with
modification, if necessary, such as a change in industrial
disaggregation. The change is needed to determine production
function of investment target sector. Additionally, identification of
target sector for government capital expenditures also needed to
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run policy simulation.
Another subsidy that is still weighing on government finances is
the electricity subsidy. In 2016, electricity subsidy reach Rp60
trillion (US$4.49 billion). According to the National Poverty
Reduction Team, only 17.8% of 23.04 million electric customers of
900 VA (Volt Ampere) entitled to receive electricity subsidy. Since
it is considered wrongly targeted, the government revoke the
electricity subsidy in three month stages namely January, March
and May 2017. At each stage of the electricity bill will rise by 32%.
On the government side, this subsidy removal can certainly ease the
government fiscal pressure. On the other hand, the hike of
electricity prices is certainly changing the household consumption
patterns. As one of the component of household expenditure that
goes in CPI (consumer price index) basket, the rise in electricity
tariffs will trigger a rise in inflation. It is interesting to research the
impact of government policy to reduce electricity subsidy on
poverty rate and income distribution. This policy should not be
counterproductive to the government efforts in reducing poverty
and income inequality. Reflecting on the inappropriateness of fuel
subsidy which favors the high and middle-income classes, is the
reduction of electricity subsidies brings improvement in the income
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distribution by reducing the real income of wealthier households? A
CGE model is needed to perform this research. The model must
specify representative households divided by their electricity
subscription of 450 VA, 900 VA and above of 900 VA. The data of
electricity subscription can be obtained from the electricity
consumption in national socio-economic survey (Susenas).
Another interesting topic is to find a combination of fiscal and
monetary policy that can increase the income of poor households,
therefore not only improving income distribution, but that might also
contribute to the solutions for structural problems in the Indonesian
economy using the FCGE method. The method allows for selecting
policy options and monetary instruments that can be used to
improve income distribution.
The next research issue is to develop a fiscal social accounting
matrix, which captures detailed government budget information
such as tax revenues, various types of government capital
expenditures and various types of subsidies. To develop this
extended SAM, the consolidation and reconciliation of government
revenues and expenditure data between the Ministry of Finance and
Statistics Indonesia (BPS) are the core of the effort.
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The final one still uses the FCGE framework, but with different
topics, it is about the impact of tax amnesty on the Indonesian
economy. The tax amnesty program in 2016 has succeeded in
collecting a redemption fee of US$7.5 billion and assets declaration
amounting to US$279 billion. This significant amount of funds will
be invested in certain businesses such as property, construction or
capital markets. The government needs to be alert to the possibility
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RP 17 33.733 8.861
RH 18 263.778 418.636 76.789 125.182 58.395
UP 19 12.250 7.640

















































































Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 2)














CB 14 33.117 0.674 8.268
CO 15 1558.080 12.590 82.006 81.424 0.081
GO 16 0.497 649.554 181.676 1.097
RP 17 26.742 0.012 6.905 0.326
RH 18 10.827 314.049 0.001 8.928 29.295 0.013
UP 19 16.857 0.006 0.334 6.559 0.165
UH 20 201.446 35.636 430.900 0.019 33.781 156.273 0.014
AGRI 21 0.049 27.305
MINE 22 0.029
MANU 23 19.774 28.086
MOIL 24 14.221 6.745
ELGW 25 2.845 0.656
BLDG 26 17.135
TRAD 27 16.897 5.402
TRAN 28 19.443 4.238
FINA 29 10.708 3.401
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EXPENDITURES
１４１
Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 3)
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
AGRI-TECH-W-R 1 119.199 22.224 21.645 26.002 2.259
AGRI-TECH-W-U 2 57.895 27.803 192.527 62.638 3.525
AGRI-TECH-NW-R 3 319.335 12.939 28.343 22.588 0.221
AGRI-TECH-NW-U 4 108.633 6.935 60.483 7.669 0.423
CLERC-W-R 5 3.871 3.426 6.791 2.933 0.904
CLERC-W-U 6 3.346 17.843 43.850 25.555 4.704
CLERC-NW-R 7 1.265 0.962 1.804 1.511 0.232
CLERC-NW-U 8 0.549 0.568 3.081 0.273 0.201
MNGR-W-R 9 1.347 1.699 1.503 1.187 0.531
MNGR-W-U 10 1.519 10.504 12.840 11.531 2.940
MNGR-NW-R 11 1.574 1.850 1.603 1.358 0.076
MNGR-NW-U 12 0.492 0.067 6.655 3.344 0.354
K 13 191.185 442.310 517.390 374.785 111.220
CB 14 0.009
CO 15 9.838 0.301 24.932
GO 16 14.062 1.454 68.458 18.832 26.722 146.464 38.018 2.350
RP 17 3.155 0.017 0.866
RH 18 1.941 0.212 10.252
UP 19 0.270 0.419 0.878
UH 20 4.558 0.018 20.253
AGRI 21 257.781 14.318 345.074 155.790 0.151 486.577 47.102
MINE 22 0.476 0.017 0.789 0.002 84.101 63.339 298.957 21.902
MANU 23 456.558 12.250 794.741 85.187 15.037 836.731 21.463 3.107
MOIL 24 109.645 2.942 190.861 88.216 15.896 213.805 210.041 35.968
ELGW 25 13.766 0.432 24.194 0.763 0.366 23.219 6.755 12.811
BLDG 26 8.234 7.908 2.865 1.069 1.003
TRAD 27 90.002 3.227 151.510 258.010 15.484 563.472 175.095 0.082
TRAN 28 84.252 3.204 138.304 34.154 14.769 131.151 65.437 0.374
FINA 29 57.716 1.999 94.031 11.989 6.906 58.225 12.806 3.007






















ROW 52 54.385 140.667 574.595 389.625 0.001












































INSTITUTIONS INDUSTRIESTri l l ion Rupiah
EXPENDITURES
１４２
Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 4)
Subs idy
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
AGRI-TECH-W-R 1 74.259 4.789 17.073 1.612 8.449
AGRI-TECH-W-U 2 73.167 18.257 33.384 6.375 29.524
AGRI-TECH-NW-R 3 11.830 4.306 23.539 0.201 4.195
AGRI-TECH-NW-U 4 10.750 12.649 33.755 0.448 8.879
CLERC-W-R 5 1.137 15.828 8.490 8.676 24.733
CLERC-W-U 6 10.610 153.268 39.671 49.533 101.576
CLERC-NW-R 7 0.528 110.107 4.229 0.942 3.602
CLERC-NW-U 8 2.927 219.398 5.858 7.687 11.250
MNGR-W-R 9 0.955 1.282 0.589 1.265 48.037
MNGR-W-U 10 7.727 11.548 7.698 17.848 119.154
MNGR-NW-R 11 1.516 1.195 0.297 0.304 1.054
MNGR-NW-U 12 5.497 2.349 1.219 3.797 11.862
K 13 226.751 84.505 141.520 274.350 100.298
CB 14
CO 15





AGRI 21 24.478 111.070 0.381 0.331 47.171 0.985 4.306
MINE 22 90.404 0.059 0.071 1.162 72.330
MANU 23 385.909 117.242 33.401 25.411 132.982 13.232 7.627
MOIL 24 215.172 63.207 123.065 7.861 58.372 154.270 13.703 8.063
ELGW 25 0.405 24.809 5.377 3.111 4.975 83.908
BLDG 26 1.203 28.300 10.499 17.327 4.329 54.168 20.890
TRAD 27 8.684 22.098 4.891 3.696 3.132
TRAN 28 11.120 93.358 53.852 16.025 8.797 1.688
FINA 29 48.480 162.432 33.442 81.431 20.564






















ROW 52 0.001 24.797 78.349 60.691 24.644













































INDUSTRIESTri l l ion Rupiah
EXPENDITURES
１４３
Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 5)





















AGRI 21 0.090 0.288
MINE 22
MANU 23 61.445 1.579 1.576 5.376 7.607 10.189 4.243 40.980
MOIL 24 15.702 15.425 18.254 2.998 4.101 37.540 1.312 17.989
ELGW 25









































































Tri l l ion Rupiah
１４４
Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 6)
INVESTMENTS


















































CFI 50 15.977 270.584 130.306 0.859 61.475 1.017 153.047
GOB 51 2.472 0.001 0.001
ROW 52













































CAPITAL ACCOUNTTri l l ion Rupiah
１４５
Indonesian FSAM 2008 (continued, part 7, end)
ROW TOTAL
50 51 52 53
AGRI-TECH-W-R 1 297.511








MNGR-W-U 10 -1.863 201.446
MNGR-NW-R 11 10.827
MNGR-NW-U 12 35.636
K 13 -84.569 2379.745
CB 14 -10.331 31.737
CO 15 -25.819 1743.433
GO 16 -26.408 1235.327
RP 17 6.099 86.716
RH 18 17.252 1335.550
UP 19 1.035 46.413
UH 20 23.645 2342.271
AGRI 21 7.447 1530.694
MINE 22 249.168 882.806
MANU 23 899.951 4021.684
MOIL 24 169.692 1815.066
ELGW 25 0.001 208.393
BLDG 26 0.001 1243.972
TRAD 27 39.340 1361.022
TRAN 28 59.967 740.133
FINA 29 17.736 627.318












CAP ACC 42 1530.237
Cap_CB 43 0.001 18.625
Cap_CO 44 491.832 37.099 1497.075
Cap_GO 45 29.243 50.225 308.941
Cap_RP 46 2.002 2.342
Cap_RH 47 0.001 82.342
Cap_UP 48 2.290 2.688
Cap_UH 49 7.526 0.244 253.963
CFI 50 -100.370 532.895
GOB 51 47.751 50.225
ROW 52 1347.755












































FIN. INSTRTri l l ion Rupiah
１４６
Major Equations in FCGE Model
Output Output = Leontief (Value added,
Intermediate demand)
Value added Value added = Road Length*CD (Capital
Stock, Labor)
Supply Output = CET (Foreign exports, Domestic
supply)
Demand Demand = Armington (Foreign imports,
Domestic demand)
Labor demand Labor demand = LD (Wage, Value added,
Net price)
Incomes Incomes = Wage + Capital returns +
Transfer




Government revenues = Indirect tax +
Direct tax + Tariff + Property Income
Government
expenditures
Government expenditures = Government
current expenditure + Government transfer




Labor demand = Labor supply
Capital market
equilibrium
Savings = Total investments
Government
budget equilibrium




Wealth = Real wealth + Bonds + Composite
financial asset
１４７
List of key behavior equations and identities
(1)Domestic import
price











(6)Value added ln( ) = + , ln , + ln( )+ ln( )
(7)Output = + ,




(10)Total supply = + (1 − )
(11)Export = (1 − )
(12)Total demand = + (1 − )
(13)Import = (1 − )
(14)Commodity
market
= , + , + ,













































(25)Labor income = ∙ , , + ∙
(26)Capital income = ( (1 − )− ( ∙ , ∙ ,+ ) + ∙
(27)Total income = ∙ , + ∙ + ,+ ++ , − , − ( ( , − , ))
(28)Savings = (1 − , )
(29)Total
consumption





(31)Total savings = +
+ , −
１４９
(32)Investments , = +
(33)Capital stock = + +








, = , + , + ,
Variables list
Road capital stock
, Policy variable for cumulative demand of financial asset
b by economic actor e
, Policy variable for cumulative supply of financial asset a
by economic actor e
, Cumulative demand of financial asset b by economic
actor e (real investment, government bonds, and
composite financial instruments)
, Cumulative supply of financial asset a by economic
actor e (real investment, government bonds, and
composite financial instruments)
Net foreign transfer to domestic economic actor (e)
Demand for financial assets a by the rest of the world
(composite financial instruments)
, Demand for financial assets b by economic actor e
Demand for financial assets by economic e (composite
financial instruments)
Demand for financial assets by economic e (real investment)
１５０




Dummy variable for government sector (economic actor e)
Real exchange rate (rupiah per dollar]
Exports by sector i
Imports by sector i
Final demand for productive investment by sector j
Total domestic investment
Subsidy by sector i
Private capital stock by sector i
, Employment by type of job m, by sector i
Total labor demand
, Lagged demand of financial asset b (real investment,
government bonds, and composite financial instruments)
Lag-private capital stock by sector i
, Lagged supply of financial asset a (real investment,
government bonds, and composite financial instruments)
Demand for financial assets a by the rest of world
(government bonds)
Price of composite goods by sector i
Rate of return on assets b
Price of composite financial instruments
Price of real investment
Price of government bonds
Rate of return of composite assets
, Final demand for private consumption of economic actor
e by sector i
Disposable income of household by economic actor e
１５１
Domestic price by sector i
Domestic price of exports by sector i
Domestic price of imports by sector i
Vale added price by sector i
World market price of exports by sector i
World market price of imports by sector i
Average output price by sector i
Composite goods supply by sector i
Dummy variable for investment (economic actor e)
Savings by economic actor e
Total savings
, Supply of financial assets a by economic actor e
(government bonds and composite financial
instruments)
Supply of financial assets a by economic actor e
(composite financial instruments)
Supply of financial assets a by economic actor e
(government bonds)
Supply of financial assets of the rest of world by
economic actor e
, Policy tool for financial asset a by economic actor e
Policy tool for financial asset a by economic actor e
(composite financial instruments)
Policy tool for financial asset a by economic actor e
(government bonds)
Value-added by sector i
Average wage rate by type of job
Wealth by economic actor e
Domestic output by sector i
Domestic sales by sector i
１５２
Economic agents income
Household income by capital
Capital factor incomes from the rest of world
Household income by labor
Labor factor incomes from the rest of world
Parameters list
Armington function shift parameter by sector i
Armington function share parameter by sector i
Armington function exponent by sector i
CET function shift parameter by sector i
CET function shift parameter by sector i
CET function exponent by sector i
, Value-added function shift parameter by sector i
, Labor share of value-added function by sector i
Capital share of value-added function by sector i
Accessibility share of value-added function by sector i
Indirect tax rate by sector i
Tariff rates on import by sector i
, Leontief input-output coefficients
, Wage adjustment share by sector i0 Shift parameters of asset demand function by economic
actor e (government bonds)0 Shift parameters of asset demand function by economic
actor e (real investment)2 Elasticity parameters of asset demand function by
economic actor e (government bonds)2 Elasticity parameters of asset demand function by
economic actor e (real investment)
１５３
, Allocation of labor income by economic actor e
Allocation of capital income by economic actor e
, Allocation of sectoral consumption of economic actor e by
sector i
Allocation of investment by destination sector j
Saving rate
, Investment matrix




연료 보조금 및 도로 투자가 소득 성장과
불균형에 미치는 영향:




본 논문의 목적은 인도네시아 정부의 연료 보조금과 도로 투자 정책
이 경제 성장과 소득 격차에 미치는 영향을 분석하는 것이다. 인도네시
아의 2008년 기준 동태적 금융 연산일반균형모형을 개발하여 정부 예산
의 연료 보조금 지원과 도로 건설 배분에 따라 소득 불평등과 경제 성장
이 어떻게 변하는 지를 동태적으로 분석하였다. 동태적 금융 연산일반균
형모형은 10개의 산 부문, 4개의 가계 및 12개의 노동으로 구성하였
으며, 자본은 2개의 금융자산 및 단일의 실물자산으로 구분하였다. 정부
재원을 도로 건설에 배분하는 것이 경제 성장을 효율적으로 유도할 수
있으며, 소득 분배의 측면에서 보면 연료 보조금을 삭감하는 정책이 가
장 효과적인 것으로 나타났다. 또한 연료 보조금 예산을 도로 투자 부문
에 이전하는 대안이 정부 예산을 가장 효과적으로 관리하는 것으로 나타
났다.
주요어: 금융연산일반균형모형, 정부보조금, 사회기반시설, 경제성장, 소
득 배분
학번: 2013-31311
